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Abstract 
 
This Study examines the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) in Europe and assesses the 
potential impact of the report adopted by the European Parliament in May 2012 
(The Bauer Report). 
 
The Study finds that the greatest potential would be with the streamlining of EU 
regulation and policy, greater transparency of pay data and broader and more 
systematic use of work evaluation and job classification. Each of these measures 
could result in an overall reduction in the GPG of a minimum of 1% point, which 
in turn has the potential to increase GDP by 0.1%. 
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1. Policy findings and recommendations 
 
This Study has focused on the following two objectives.  
 
 To understand the extent and impact of the Gender Pay Gap (GPG) in Europe. 
 To assess how proposals adopted by the European Parliament in May 2012 (The 
Bauer Report) could impact on reducing the GPG and economic growth. 
 
1.1 Policy findings 
 
The main policy findings of the Study are as follows: 
  
 At a level of 16.4% the GPG across the EU remains large, with wide variation 
evident by country, sector and industry. 
 Whilst the gap is lower in the public than the private sector, it is the private 
sector that has seen greater reductions over recent years. 
 Evidence suggests that interventions to address the GPG can have a positive 
impact on economic growth.  
 An estimate for this Study estimates that each 1% reduction in the GPG would 
result in an increase in GDP of 0.1%. 
 Bauer Report recommendations all have the potential to positively impact on 
reducing the GPG. 
 Large variation in terms of Member States which have partially, fully, or not 
implemented policies aligned to the Bauer Recommendations. 
 Secondary assessment suggests the Bauer Recommendations that have greatest 
potential to impact on the GPG are: 
 
1. Streamlining of EU regulation and policy with a particular focus on part time 
work. 
2. Improved situational analysis and transparency of results in relation to pay 
data. 
3. Work Evaluation and Job Classification at Member State level underpinned 
by high levels of transparency. 
 
It is estimated that the impact of introducing any one of the five Bauer Recommendations 
considered in this Study could lead to a reduction in the GPG of between 1% and 3%. 
 
1.2 Recommendations 
 
The main recommendations that can be drawn from the Study are as follows: 
 
 The European Parliament’s should continue to prioritise actions focused on 
reducing the GPG. 
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 The implementation of 2006 Equal Pay Directive and related European legislation 
should be assessed urgently to assess their effectiveness. 
 Specific consideration should be given to the revision of Council Directive 
97/81/EC. 
 The impact of measures aimed at reducing the GPG and the manner in which 
this impacts on economic growth, should be assessed further in order to better 
understand how the former impacts upon the latter. 
 Further work should also be undertaken to understand the interdependencies 
between EU and Member State policies and practice and so maximise overall 
policy impact. 
 Assessment should take place as to how prioritise initiatives in the Bauer Report 
that have been shown to have the greatest potential and to bring these together 
into a single coherent policy and legislative response.  
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2. Executive summary  
 
The European Parliament has urged the European Commission to improve existing EU 
legislation to close the GPG, including stricter sanctions on employers. The request for a 
legislative proposal points out that the GPG still averages 16.4% in the EU, and in some 
Member States is growing. 
 
The principle of equal treatment of women and men is set out in the Treaty of Rome 
(1957). In 1975, the Council adopted Directive 75/117/EEC - the Equal Pay Directive. 
Additional Directives include Directive 76/207/EE (Equal Treatment Directive) and 
Directive 97/80/EC (Burden of Proof Directive). A total of seven Directives in the context 
of equal treatment between women and men were combined in 2006 in a single Directive 
to offer more distinctness to Community law and to support the field of equal treatment 
between women and men. The Commission also produced a “Roadmap for equality 
between women and men 2006-2010”.  
  
With the adoption by the European Parliament of the Bauer Report in May 2012 they 
have called on the Commission to propose new measures to reduce inequality in pay 
between the sexes through all relevant EU policies and national programmes. They also 
ask national governments to step up cooperation and develop new ideas to tackle the 
GPG. 
 
2.1   Study objectives 
This Study looks at the European Added Value of applying the principle of equal pay. 
There are four broad research questions. To assess: 
 
 The extent of the GPG;  
 The impact of the GPG on economic performance; 
 The prevalence and effectiveness of measures similar to those in the Bauer Report 
that are currently implemented within Member States;  
 The potential for the policy recommendations set out in the Bauer Report to 
further impact on reducing the GPG and increasing economic growth. 
 
The aim of the Study is to provide a level of quantification to the recommendations 
contained in the Bauer Report that was debated and accepted by the European 
Parliament in May 2012.  
 
2.2 Methods & approach 
The Research Team undertook an Internet-based literature review alongside an 
assessment of the limited available data on the impact of policy on reducing the GPG. 
This was then used to provide a high-level estimate of the minimum and maximum level 
of impact that legislative action based upon the Bauer Recommendations could have on 
reducing the GPG and increasing GDP. 
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2.3 Scale of the GPG 
There exists a consistent picture across the EU regarding the existence of the GPG, 
although its level varies. This gap is widest in Estonia, Austria, Germany, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia and narrowest in Slovenia, Poland, and Italy  (Eurostat, 2011 
figures). Whilst almost all Member States have introduced specific gender equality 
regulations, the monitoring practices and the enforcement mechanisms vary 
substantially across Member States. 
 
The most recent available unadjusted GPG data (% difference between average gross 
hourly earnings of male and female employees, as % of male gross earnings) shows the 
GPG ranges from 2.3 % in Slovenia to 27.3 % in Estonia (Eurostat, 2011 data). The data 
from 2011 shows that on average, women earned 16.21 % less on gross hourly earnings 
than men in the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2011 data).  
 
Despite significant equal pay initiatives in local government and the health sector, there 
has been little progress in recent years in closing the GPG in the public sector, which 
currently stands at 14.6% (based on mean full-time hourly earnings) up from 13.9% in 
2008. While the public sector GPG is significantly lower than the full-time private sector 
GPG (21.6%), the private sector gap has fallen five percentage points since 1997.  
 
2.4 Benefit of reducing the GPG 
There is mixed evidence on the impact of reducing the GPG on economic growth. 
Whilst some studies are able to point to significant increases in GDP resulting from 
reductions in the GPG, others demonstrate small negative impacts.  
 
The Study finding the largest aggregate impact of a reduction in the GPG on GDP came 
from Australia. This Study also assessed the potential for any reduction to impact on 
economic growth. Drawing upon secondary evidence it has been possible to establish 
that reducing the GPG can have a positive impact on economic growth. The economic 
assessment made for this Study suggests that a decrease in the gender wage gap by one 
percentage point would increase economic growth by 0.1 %. 
 
2.5 Impact of the GPG 
The secondary evidence search and review found limited quantitative evidence of the 
costs to employers in terms of loss of productivity, and no quantitative evidence of the 
costs of low staff morale and loss of reputation as a result of failure to provide equal pay. 
Evidence on cost to employers was largely indicative. 
 
The Study identified evidence suggesting a link between the GPG and reduced 
productivity with one Study finding gender discrimination accounting for 29 % of the 
pay and productivity gap, which as a result impacts GDP and economic growth. 
                                            
1Provisional data as at March 2013 
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However, the Study did not quantify this impact. Smith & Bettio (2010) cite a Study by 
Elmeskov and Scarpetta (2000) which calculated that a “lower utilisation of labour 
contributes more than 20 percentage points to the gap in GDP per capita. 
 
2.6 Bauer Report recommendations 
In May 2012, the European Parliament adopted a legislative initiative report on Equal 
pay (Bauer Report), calling on the European Commission and other related bodies to 
review Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation, before February 2013.  
 
The terms of reference for the Study required us to focus on five of the eleven 
recommendations and to assess their potential to positively impact upon the GPG. Our 
assessment established that each of the five measures that were considered could each 
positively impact on reducing the GPG.  
 
Factors that would determine their level of impact were identified as being: 
 
 evidence of the effectiveness of the particular measure; 
 size of the GPG within a particular Member State; and 
 the degree to which the measure has already been implemented partially or 
substantively within a Member State. 
 
In Table 1 we set out the Research Team’s summary assessment of the five sub-options 
within the Bauer Report that were subject to review. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Bauer Recommendations 
Option 
Assessment 
Improved situational analysis and 
transparency of results 
Impact 
Assessment 
 
Overview Indirect impact through greater transparency of 
pay data. 
Potential 
Impact 
High 
Baseline 
Situation 
Policies linked to income transparency; 
increasing the availability of data and wage 
statistics; and preparation of comparative wage 
reports are particularly evident in Denmark, 
Finland, France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden. 
Evaluations have viewed such schemes to 
‘serve as good practice’. 
Current 
Member State 
Adoption 
Level 
Medium 
to High 
Implementation  Some technical issues but relatively 
straightforward implementation possible. 
Likely Impact  Medium 
to Low 
Summary A strong and implementable measure, but 
already evident to a limited or greater extent 
in 26 out of 27 Member States. 
Approximate 
Potential GPG 
Reduction 
Under 
2% 
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Option 
Assessment 
Work Evaluation and Job Classification Impact 
Assessment 
 
Overview To encourage Member States to introduce job 
classification and to make this process as 
transparent as possible 
Potential 
Impact 
High 
Baseline 
Situation 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands were 
identified as having made particular progress, 
with large-scale re-classifications concentrated 
in particular sectors e.g. Portugal and the hotel 
and restaurant sector. 
Member State 
Adoption 
Level 
Medium 
to Low 
Implementation  A range of means available to develop such 
initiatives many of which are linked to 
establishing new targets for the reduction of the 
GPG. 
Likely Impact  Medium 
to High 
Summary A strong and implementable measure, which 
has only been fully implemented in 3 out of 
27 Member States. 
Approximate 
Potential GPG 
Reduction 
2% 
 
Option 
Assessment 
Equality Bodies and Legal Remedies Impact 
Assessment 
 
Overview To empower and ensure adequate funding for 
equality bodies within Member States and to 
enhance their mandate. 
Potential 
Impact  
Low 
Baseline 
Situation 
Wide variation in role and scope with some 
being able to be proactive and other only 
reactive. Some research evidence of a 
reluctance of some bodies to pursue cases. 
Member State 
Adoption 
Level 
Medium 
to High 
Implementation  Some complication in terms of the legal basis 
for equality bodies but apparent that many 
Member States have already sought to develop 
this route. 
Likely Impact  Low 
Summary A well established mechanism which is 
established to some degree in all 27 Member 
States, but with only limited potential to 
impact on the GPG 
Approximate 
Potential GPG 
Reduction 
Under 
1% 
 
Option 
Assessment 
Sanctions Impact 
Assessment 
 
Overview For the Commission and Member States to be 
encouraged to strengthen current legislation. 
Potential 
Impact  
Medium 
Baseline 
Situation 
Variation in the type and level of sanctions and 
limited evidence of Member States explicitly 
implementing them. 
Member State 
Adoption 
Level 
Medium  
Implementation  Member States have put considerable efforts 
into overcoming the challenges of setting 
systems up yet full implementation remains an 
issue. 
Likely Impact  Medium 
Summary Just over a third of Member States are stated 
to have sanctions in place but 17 do not. 
Approximate 
Potential GPG 
Reduction 
Between 
1% -2% 
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Option 
Assessment 
Streamlining of EU regulation & Policy Impact 
Assessment 
 
Overview With a particular focus on part time work this 
may involve a revision of Council Directive 
97/81/EC. 
Potential 
Impact  
High 
Baseline 
Situation 
Some notable schemes have been introduced 
within Member States, yet studies have shown 
how they may impact to reduce the GPG but 
also reduce per capita GDP, although again the 
picture is not consistent. 
Member State 
Adoption 
Level 
Medium  
Implementation  A range of schemes have been developed to 
address the issue of part-time work as it 
impacts on the GPG. 
Likely Impact  Medium 
Summary While there is evidence of 13 Member States 
having done this, nearly half have not. 
Approximate 
Potential GPG 
Reduction 
2% 
 
This second table provides an overview of each of the initiatives by Member State with 
the shades of green representing potentially high impact resulting from European 
legislation based upon the Bauer Recommendations, the shades of orange representing 
mid-range impact and the shades of red suggesting limited impact for the measures 
within the particular Member State. A full description of the methodology and results is 
set out in Table 10. 
 
The findings again suggest significant potential for Measures 2 and 5, a degree of impact 
for options 4 and 1 and only limited impact for option 3. 
 
Table 2: Potential Impact of Bauer Recommendations by Member State 
Member State Measure 1 
Transparency 
of Results 
Measure 2. 
Work 
Evaluation 
Measure 3. 
Equality 
Bodies 
Measure 4. 
Sanctions 
Measure 5. 
EU 
Regulations 
Austria      
Belgium      
Bulgaria      
Cyprus      
Czech 
Republic 
 
 
   
Denmark      
Estonia      
Finland      
France      
Germany      
Greece*      
Hungary      
Ireland      
Italy      
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Member State Measure 1 
Transparency 
of Results 
Measure 2. 
Work 
Evaluation 
Measure 3. 
Equality 
Bodies 
Measure 4. Measure 5. 
Sanctions EU 
Regulations 
Latvia      
Lithuania      
Luxembourg      
Malta      
Netherlands      
Poland      
Portugal      
Romania      
Slovakia      
Slovenia      
Spain      
Sweden      
United 
Kingdom 
 
 
   
 
2.7 Conclusions 
The GPG in the EU is significant, with evident variations between Member States. There 
is evidence of a body of both European law and Member State laws and initiatives, many 
of which have demonstrated the potential to have a positive impact on the GPG.  
 
Each of the five Bauer report measures considered in this Study could have an impact on 
reducing the GPG, which in turn could positively impact on European GDP growth.  
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3. Introduction 
 
The European Parliament has urged the European Commission to improve existing EU 
legislation to close the GPG, including stricter sanctions on employers. The request for a 
legislative proposal points out that the GPG still averages 16.4% in the EU, and in some 
member states is increasing. 
 
MEPs have called on the Commission to propose new measures to reduce inequality in pay 
between the sexes through all relevant EU policies and national programmes. They also ask 
national governments to step up cooperation and develop new ideas to tackle the GPG. 
 
3.1 Study Objectives 
The aim of the Study is to provide a level of quantification as well as a qualitative 
assessment to the recommendations contained in the Bauer Report. Within the scope of 
the Study this will only be possible at an indicative level and further work would be 
required to establish precise estimations.  
 
The overall study objective is to set out the current situation regarding the GPG across 
the 27 Member States of the European Union and to assess the costs of this at the level of 
the individual, industry and the wider society. The terms of reference set this out in terms 
of the following four objectives:  
 
1. Provide an overview of the situation with respect to equal pay for men and women; 
2. Examine the financial and economic costs of the GPG;  
3. Outline the economic impact of the persisting GPG; and  
4. Consider the costs to employers, deriving from the failure to provide equal pay 
 
The fifth objective then focuses on assessing the potential impact of implementing the 
recommendation of the Bauer report, setting the precise objective to be: 
 
5. Assess the economic added value of the measures proposed in the Bauer report 
compared to the existing legal framework. 
 
3.2 Methods & Approach 
As a rapid review we have utilised a limited range of research tools and a focused 
research design. The design has been focused on being able to produce a robust high-
level indication of impact. The research tools employed were as follows: 
 
 Secondary Evidence – collated relevant materials provided by the client and 
have in addition undertaken an Internet based evidence review; 
 Data Review – We have accessed a range of relevant data from secondary 
sources at both a Member State and EU wide level including Eurostat.  
 Client Engagement – We have held a number of meetings with colleagues at the 
European Parliament to aid the development of the options and to validate 
research findings;   
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 Economic Assessment – structured economic modelling is not feasible within the 
scope and timeframes for this Study, but we have developed an evidenced, 
robust and transparent means to consider each of the options to address the GPG;  
 Reporting – in line with the agreed terms of reference. 
 
The Research Team undertook an Internet-based secondary evidence review in order to 
collate relevant documents and data to examine the extent of the GPG and its impact and 
to identify the extent to which each of the 27 Member States have introduced policies 
relating to the five recommendations from the Bauer report set out in the terms of 
reference for this Study. For the latter task we have created country profiles (Annex 1.) 
based on the secondary evidence, which present a high level Study of the policies already 
implemented and indicate through colour coding where the Member State has translated 
policy into mandatory, legislative requirements (significant development, coded green); 
where there has been partial development in the policy area, including focused efforts by 
the social partners (partial development, coded yellow); and where no references have 
been found on policy actions in the area linked to the Bauer recommendations (no 
development, coded red).  This assessment will be used to help inform and establish the 
potential impact of measures relating to each of the five Bauer recommendations set out 
in the terms of reference at a pan-European level.  
 
Given the high-level nature of this Study, we have not examined uptake or compliance in 
the Member State, nor do we present an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of these policies.  The country profiles included in the Annex represent the 
findings from our evidence review to date.    
 
In order to gather evidence for this Study, we have reviewed European-level documents, 
such as those produced by Eurofound, the European Commission and the OECD, in 
addition to national-level documents and research studies. Data on the extent of the GPG 
in the EU Member States was obtained through Eurostat. The GPG as measured by 
Eurostat in unadjusted form represents “the difference between average gross hourly 
earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of 
average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees” (Eurostat, 2012). The unadjusted 
indicator is “not adjusted according to individual characteristics that may explain part of 
the earnings difference” (ibid). The sources to inform the secondary evidence review are 
included in the references. 
 
The report is structured as follows: Section 4 provides an overview of the GPG within the 
European Union, examining evidence concerning impacts, existing data on costs and 
presents country-level analysis. Section 5 focuses on the Bauer Report and the 
recommendations set out within it. It looks at examples within Member States that align 
to these recommendations, concluding with a section assessing the potential impact that 
each measure may have within Member States. Section 6 estimates the economic impact 
of a reduction in the GPG. Section 7 outlines the main Study conclusions and 
implications for future research in the area.  
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4. Assessing the GPG 
 
This section provides a summary overview of the GPG in the European Union. In 
addition to an EU wide assessment, rates and trends in Member States are also 
considered. The chapter then presents a high level assessment of the economic impact of 
the GPG including particular consideration of costs to business. 
 
4.1 The GPG in the European Union 
The most recent available unadjusted GPG data (% difference between average gross 
hourly earnings of male and female employees, as % of male gross earnings) shows the 
GPG ranges from 2.3 % in Slovenia to 27.3 % in Estonia (Eurostat, 2011 data) (see Figure 1 
below). The data from 2011 shows that on average, women earned 16.22 % less on gross 
hourly earnings than men in the EU-27 (Eurostat, 2011 data). The GPG for full-time 
employees is largest in Austria at 22 % and lowest in Italy at -1 % (based on 2010 figures) 
(Eurostat, 2010 data). A negative GPG (-1%) indicates that on average, women earn more 
than men. This does not necessarily mean that the labour market is more favourable for 
women, with the following factors being found to either positively or negatively 
influence the GPG: 
 
 Female participation in the labour market 
  Human capital 
  Occupational segregation 
  Part-time work and caring responsibilities 
  Valuation of women’s work 
  Discrimination 
  Structural and institutional factors (all cited by EWG, 2011) 
 
The GPG for part-time workers also ranges from -17 % in Ireland (based on 2010 figures) 
to 35 % in Spain (Eurostat, 2013). 
 
Whilst almost all Member States have implemented specific gender equality regulations, 
the actual enforcement mechanisms vary considerably between countries. In May 2012, 
European Parliament adopted the Bauer Report on the GPG, which calls on the European 
Commission to revise and amend the Recast Directive 2006/54/EC in order to close the 
GPG. The report contains recommendations for the Commission on equal pay. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
2 Provisional data as at March 2013 
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Figure 1: The unadjusted GPG, 2011, Eurostat 
 
4.2 EU legislative framework  
The European Union has addressed the issue of equal pay in a number of distinct ways.  
The fundamental principle of equal treatment of women and men is set out in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957). Within the Treaty Article 157 of the TFEU calls on Member States to 
ensure the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value 
for both men and women. The Article states that within its bounds individual Member 
States are able to take particular actions to address the issue within their own country.    
 
The issue of gender pay was addressed directly in 1975 with the Equal Pay Directive 
75/117/EEC. This Directive provided a newly defined principle of equal pay including 
that of remuneration for the same work or work of equal value. Significant case law 
relating both to Article 157 and the Directive 75/117/EEC has been developed by the 
Court of Justice subsequent to the introduction of the Directive. 
 
Two other Directives of relevance to the GPG are as follows: 
 
 Directive 76/207/EEC, implementing the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women in the area of employment, vocational training, promotion, and 
working conditions (Equal Treatment Directive) 
 
 Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof, making the respondent responsible 
for proving that there has been no breach of principle of equal treatment if facts 
suggesting so are presented (Burden of Prof Directive).  
 
In 2006 a single Directive sought to bring together a number of legislative streams. Seven 
Directives in the context of equal treatment between women and men were combined 
and by 2009 approximately 200 European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions had been made 
with respect to the issue of gender pay.  
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In 2007 the Commission issued the Communication “Tackling the pay gap between 
women and men"3, setting out the following four priorities: 
 Exploring ways to improve the legislative framework and its implementation. 
 Exploiting to the full the European Strategy for Growth and Jobs. 
 Encouraging employers to respect equal pay. 
 Supporting the exchange of good practice at EU level. 
 
In 2011 the European Commission published its “Roadmap for equality between women 
and men 2006-2010”. The document sets out six priorities in the field of gender equality 
including the accomplishment of equal economic independence for women and men, 
with the elimination of the GPG set as one of the main objectives.  
 
4.3 Assessment of the GPG 
In Table 3, the unadjusted GPG for the 27 Member States. The unadjusted figure does not 
take account of differences in education, training, experience, and job characteristics 
among other things.  An adjusted assessment would include the extent to which women 
and men are paid the same amount for equal work or work of equal value. 
 
Table 3: Summary Table on Unadjusted GPG, Eurostat, 2011 data 
Member State Whole economy Public Sector Private Sector 
Austria  23.7* 19.6 (2010 data) 24.6 (2010 data) 
Belgium  10.2 -2.9% 13.8 
Bulgaria 13.0 19.9 11.1 
Cyprus 16.4* 0.3* 25.0* 
Czech Republic 21.0 19.5 22.8 
Denmark 16.4 13.5 18.2 
Estonia  27.3% : : 
Finland 18.2* 20.9* 18.3* 
France  14.7* 13.2 (2010 data) 16.4 (2010 data) 
Germany  22.2* 13.9* 25.8* 
Greece  : : : 
Hungary  18.0 20.5 15.3 
Ireland 13.9 (2010 data) 12.1 21.6 
Italy 5.8 3.8 16.7 
Latvia 13.6 17.5 13.4 
Lithuania 11.9 12.1 16.0 
Luxembourg  8.7* 9.3 (2009 data) 10.9 (2009 data) 
Malta  12.9 -1.3 (2010 data) 11.9 (2010 data) 
Netherlands 17.9 18.1 18.1 
Poland 4.5 0.1 17.2 
                                            
3 COM/2007/424 final 
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Member State Whole economy Public Sector Private Sector 
Portugal 12.5 10.8 23.5 
Romania 12.1 22.8** 2.9** 
Slovakia 20.5 16.7 21.0 
Slovenia 2.3 6.4 9.4 
Spain 16.2* 12.3* 20.3* 
Sweden 15.8 13.6 13.7 
United Kingdom 20.1 20.3 26.0 
(*) Provisional  (**) Estimated data  (:) Data unavailable 
Note: A negative GPG indicates that on average, women earn more than men. 
 
4.4 Public and private sector Comparisons 
As the above table indicates, in most European states the GPG is lower in the public sector 
than in the private sector. This fact is especially interesting, considering that throughout the 
EU the proportion of women employed in the public sector is significantly higher than in 
the private sector. However, it can also be the case that in a country with low female labour 
market participation, the proportion of women working in the public sector is considerably 
higher compared to the overall female labour market participation. 
 
Nevertheless, not only the level of pay divergence tends to differ, moreover different 
dynamics in closing the GPG in the public and private sector can be identified. A 
literature review of the GPG in the UK for example describes the following:  
 
 ‘Despite significant equal pay initiatives in local government and the health 
sector, there has been little progress in recent years in closing the GPG in the 
public sector, which currently stands at 14.6% (based on mean full-time hourly 
earnings) up from 13.9% in 2008. While the gap is significantly lower than the 
full-time private sector GPG (21.6%), the private sector gap has fallen five 
percentage points since 1997. Part of the lack of progress in the GPG in the public 
sector is explained by the lack of representation of females in senior management 
roles in the sector. Women represent 53% of all employees in the civil service, but 
occupy only 33% of senior management roles.’ (EWG, 2011:3) 
 
In addition the GPG may be at risk of widening up in some countries due to public sector 
job cuts, which depending on the proportion of women employed in the sector bears the 
risk of disproportionally affecting women.  
 
Generally speaking, public sector employees are typically protected by collective pay 
agreements, which may be one of the reasons why there is a tendency for a lower GPG in 
the public sector. Other reasons for the persistence of wage gaps between public and 
private sector are, for example, the type of job carried out or the level of employees’ 
qualifications, as the UK Office for National Statistics indicates:  
 
 ‘Female employees in the public sector earn considerably more, on average, than 
female employees in the private sector. This is due to the different jobs that are 
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typically carried out by women in the public and private sectors. In the private 
sector women carry out a significant proportion of low paid jobs, such as 
cleaning and catering. In the public sector, while women still perform lower paid 
jobs, such as caring and clerical work, there are also a high proportion of women 
employed in professional, higher paid occupations, such as nursing or teaching. 
(…) overall, the public sector consists of a higher qualified workforce than the 
private sector. A higher qualified workforce would, on average, receive higher 
pay than a less qualified workforce. Therefore, it would be expected that, on 
average, the higher level of qualifications in the public sector would translate 
into higher average earnings in the public sector compared with the private 
sector.’ (ONS, 2012: p.13) 
 
While statistics show that the majority of EU Member States have a higher GPG in the 
private sector, this is not the case for countries such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary, 
Romania, and Finland (see Eurostat, 2013). Foubert (2010) states that in Hungary, a 
higher GPG in the public sector could be attributed to the “limited opportunity in the 
public sector to resort to non-reported labour and non-reported payments” (Foubert, 
2010:5); which is reported to be widely used in the private sector in Hungary.  
 
4.5 Impact of Gender Gap 
Secondary evidence was found to be limited in terms of relevant evidence on the 
economic and financial impact of the GPG across the EU, suggesting this to be an area 
which has not been examined in particular depth and could be an area for more detailed 
research in future. The limited available literature on this subject, however, suggests that 
the impact of reducing the GPG would result in a positive economic impact, in terms of 
an increase in GDP within Member States. The extent of the impact, however, varies 
considerably across the literature (and also varies significantly by country). One should 
also note that measuring economic performance using GDP overall undervalues 
women’s total economic contribution as women’s unpaid domestic activities do not 
appear in national accounts (Klasen, 1999; 2002, cited in Cassells et al, 2009).  
 
The table below summaries the quantitative evidence in the existing literature of the 
economic impact of decreasing or increasing the GPG (or gender pap). This evidence 
suggests that decreasing the gender gap results in an increase in economic performance 
(GDP), whilst a widening of the gap results in a decrease in income/GDP.   
 
Table 4: Summary of studies on economic impact of the Gender gap 
 Source Factors Impact on GDP 
Impact of 
decreasing the 
gender gap 
Davy, 2007 Female employment 
levels rise to level of 
male employment 
Increase in output per 
person of 0.3pp-0.4pp  
A net overall impact on 
GDP of 0.6 pp-0.7pp 
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Caro, 2008 Increase in women’s 
working hours as 
result of eradication 
of the GPG 
Increase in GDP per 
capita of 17.6 %  in 
spain 
Löfström, 2008 Transition to full 
gender equality in the 
labour market 
GDP increase range 
from 14 % to more than 
40 % across Member 
States 
Decrease in the 
gender wage gap of 1 
percentage point 
Increase of 0.5 % of 
total GDP in Australia 
Cassells et al, 
2009 
Eradication of the 
GPG  
8.5 % of GDP or a 
growth in GDP of 
around $93 billion 
Goldman Sachs, 
2011 
Elimination of the 
GPG between male 
and female 
employment rate 
Increase in GDP in 
America by 9 % and in 
the Euro Zone by 13 % 
The Institute for 
Women’s Policy 
Research (2012) 
Eradication of GPG Growth in the US 
economy of at least 3 of 
4 % 
A 50 % decrease in 
the gender gap in 
labour force 
participation rates 
GDP per capita annual 
growth rate of 0.3 
percentage points 
Male and female 
labour force 
participation gap 
reduced by 75% by 
2030 
GDP per capita annual 
growth rate of 0.5 % 
OECD, 2012 
Total convergence of 
participation rates by 
2030 
GDP per capita annual 
growth rate of 0.6 
percentage points, 
(equivalent to an 
overall increase of 12 % 
in GDP over 20 years.) 
The Women and 
Work 
Commission, 
2009 
Reduction in the GPG Between £15 and £23 
billion or 1.3 to 2 % of 
GDP saved every year 
in UK 
The Gender and 
Employment in 
Local Labour 
Markets Project, 
2006 and TUC, 
2008 
Gap between hourly 
wages in full-time 
and part-time work 
closed 
Total increase in GDP 
of £11.2 billion 
Impact of 
widening the 
gender gap 
Cavalcanti and 
Tavares ,2007 
50 % increase in the 
GPG 
Decrease in income per 
capita of a quarter of 
the original income per 
capita on cross country 
comparison 
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4.6 Discussion of the economic impact on GDP 
A macroeconomic approach to gender equality indicates that increasing women’s 
participation in the labour market has accounted for a quarter of annual economic 
growth in Europe since 1995 (OECD, 2008).  This “positive development has contributed 
to greater recognition of the ‘economic case’ for gender equality’” (EC, 2011). Further 
research has shown that by narrowing the gender employment gap, the economic results 
are positively impacted and “could play a role in addressing the problems posed by an 
ageing population and the burden of pensions” (ibid.). For example, the Corporate 
Gender Gap Report 2010, World Economic Forum, quotes a possible increase of 13% in 
Euro-area GDP (Davy, 2007). Davy (2007) stated that the narrowing of the gender 
employment rates across the Eurozone had accounted for half of the growth in the 
Eurozone total employment rate and 0.4 percentage points of the 2.1% trend growth 
achieved since 1995 (Davy, 2007). Davy also concludes that if female employment were to 
rise to the level of male employment (all else being equal), GDP would increase by 21% in 
Italy; 19% in Spain; 9% in Germany and France; 8% in the UK; 5% in Denmark and 3% in 
Sweden (Davy, 2007). Davy (2007) states that: 
 
 “Empirical estimates suggest that raising the employment rate by 1 percentage 
point has, on average, an offsetting drag on output per person of 0.3pp-0.4pp 
(i.e., leaving a net overall impact on GDP of 0.6 pp-0.7pp). But the offsetting drag 
on productivity may be less than 0.3pp-0.4pp when the rise in employment is 
due to a narrowing of the male-female employment gap rather than, for instance, 
a generalised reduction in unemployment. Moreover, even accounting for these 
offsetting effects, the potential boost to income from raising female employment 
would still be substantial.” (Davy, 2007) 
 
Walby and Olsen (2002, cited in Cassells et al, 2009) also assess the impact of the GPG on 
productivity. They use wages as a proxy measure of productivity in order to estimate the 
impact of gender discrimination on the pay gap. They found that gender discrimination 
accounted for 29 % of the pay and productivity gap, which as a result impacts GDP and 
economic growth (however, they did not quantify this impact) (cited in Cassells et al, 
2009). Cassells et al  (2009) also found evidence in studies from Cavalcanti and Tavares 
(2007) and Caro (2008) that suggests “a higher gender wage gap (measured as female to 
male earning ratios) leads to lower output per capita indirectly” through female labour 
force participation. Through female labour force participation, they suggest that as “the 
gender wage gap decreases, women work more, due to the added wage incentive, and 
thus GDP per capita increases” (cited in Cassell et al, 2009).  
 
However, Cassells et al (2009) also state that “differences in labour market structures” are 
an important consideration, citing a Study by Sequino (2000) who found that the GPG 
was a “stimulus (rather than a hindrance) to GDP growth in export-oriented economies, 
in her Study of semi-industrialised countries. However, this finding may only be relevant 
for semi-industrialised or developing countries that rely on manufacturing exports as a 
significant component of output.” (cited in Cassells et al, 2009). Cavalcanti and Tavares 
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(2007) and Caro (2008) (cited in Cassells et al, 2009) found that as the GPG is reduced, the 
“opportunity cost of having children increased”, which reduces the fertility rate, which in 
turn increases women’s working hours and as a consequence GDP per capita is increased 
(cited in Cassells et al, 2009). Cavalcanti and Tavares (2007) used a cross-country analysis 
of both developed and developing countries and found that a “50 % increase in the GPG 
caused a decrease in income per capita of a quarter of the original income per capita and 
an increase in hours worked at home by 65 %” (cited in Cassells et al, 2009).  Similarly, 
Caro (2008) found in a Study of Spain that eradication of the GPG would result in an 
increase in women’s working hours of 20 % and an increase in GDP per capita of 17.6 % 
(cited in Cassells et al, 2009).  
 
A Study by Löfström (2008) calculated the potential increase in GDP in the EU Member 
States following transition to full gender equality in the labour market – described as 
female activity becoming equal to that of men; women’s part-time work declining to the 
level of that for men; and women’s productivity becoming equal to that of men. The 
report suggests that each of these transitions would result in a positive GDP effect, with 
GDP increases ranging from 14 % in Slovenia to more than 40 % in Malta, Greece, and the 
Netherlands. “These estimates give an indication of the magnitude of the economic gains 
to be had from gender equality” (Löfström, 2008:26).  
 
An Australian Study cited by Cassells et al (2009) also provides an account of the impact 
of the gender wage gap on economic growth and is of interest as it provides some 
guidance on the scale of the impact and also in terms of the assumptions and limitations 
underpinning the micro and macroeconomic models used to calculate the impact of the 
GPG. Using macroeconomic modelling techniques, the Study finds that the GPG impacts 
substantially on Australian economic performance, measured in terms of GDP per capita. 
The paper estimates that a decrease in the gender wage gap of 1 percentage point would 
equate to an increase of 0.5 % of total GDP and eradicating the GPG completely would be 
worth about 8.5 % of GDP or a growth in GDP of around $93 billion (Cassels et al, 2009).  
 
Cassells et al also model the impact of various factors to provide evidence on the negative 
effects of the pay gap on growth. They find that if the gender wage gap increased by one 
percentage point, average hours of work would decrease, and GDP per capita would fall 
by 0.318 %. This finding is explainable in the sense that if there was an increased GPG, 
this is likely to act as a disincentive to women to work longer hour and reduced working 
hours lowers economic growth (Cassells et al, 2009).  Alternatively, a decrease the GPG 
has been “significantly associated” with an increase in women’s hours of work” (Cassells 
et al, 2009; 23), however, Cassells et al note that the ability of women to increase their 
hours of work is affected by factors including unemployment rates; availability and 
affordability of childcare and access to flexible working arrangements. Other factors in 
the Cassells et al model, whilst not having statistically significant effects, show that (with 
the exception of labour market participation) if the gender wage gap increased by one 
percentage point, the effect on economic growth based on the impact of the various 
factors is negative (see Table 5).   
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Table 5: The impact of the gender wage gap on economic growth (GDP per capita) 
Factors Impact (co-efficients) 
Impact on GDP per capita -0.250 
Investment= Impact on GDP per capita -0.021 
Fertility= Impact on GDP per capita -0.181 
Average hours of work = Impact on GDP per capita -0.318 
Labour participation = Impact on GDP per capita 0.263 
Total impact on GDP per capita -0.507 
Source: Cassells et al, 2009 
 
Their simulated model also shows: 
 
 “If the negative effects of being a woman, (which include direct discrimination) 
were removed, the gender wage gap would decrease by 60 %, or an equivalent 
$1.87 per hour” (Cassells et al, 2009: 17). Based on an average working week of 35 
hours for a women, this would equate to an additional earnings of $65 a week, or 
$3,394 in a year”  
 If women and men were represented equally within industries, this could result 
in a 25 % reduction in the GPG. Based on a 35-hour working week this would 
mean an additional $27 for the average female in Australia. “The hourly wage for 
women would increase by 22 cents per hour (seven % of the wage gap) if their 
labour market history was also equivalent to that of men” (Cassells et al, 2009:17)  
 “If the representation of women with vocational qualifications increased to the 
same proportion as men, we would see the wage gap decrease by five %, or 15 
cents per hour. Representation of women in larger firms to similar proportions as 
those of men would also have a positive impact on women’s wages, decreasing 
the wage gap by three %, which would mean an increase in hourly wages of 11 
cents on average” (Cassells et al , 2009:17) (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Impact of reduction in the GPG in Australia 
 % reduction in 
overall GPG 
Cents/hour 
equivalent 
$/per 35 hour 
working week 
$/per year 
Labour force 
history 
7 22 7.78 404 
Vocational 
qualification 
5 15 5.26 273 
Industry 
segregation 
25 79 27.52 1,431 
Firm size 3 11 3.73 194 
Female 60 187 65.26 3.394 
Total 100 313 109.55 5,697 
Note: These calculations use simulation methodology developed by Olsen and Walby 
Source: Cassells R, Vidyattama Y, Miranti R, McNamara J (2009) 
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In a recent report, the OECD also explored the economic case for gender equality. The 
report focuses on the effects of convergence between male and simulation methodology 
developed by Olsen and Walby. It presents three scenarios: a no-change scenario where 
the gap between male and female labour force participation rates remain the same as 
those observed in 2010; a scenario whereby gender gaps reduce by 50 % by 2030; and a 
scenario whereby there is convergence in participation rates and the gender gap in labour 
force participation levels is eradicated by 2030 (OECD, 2012).  
 
The report shows that on average across the OECD, a 50 % decrease in the gender gap in 
labour force participation rates would lead to an increase in the GDP per capita annual 
growth rate of 0.3 percentage points. If there was total convergence of participation rates 
by 2030, the increase would equate to 0.6 percentage points, which it states is equivalent 
to an overall increase of 12 % in GDP over 20 years. The largest increases, at more than 
0.5 %, from total convergence, were forecast for Italy, the Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland and the Slovak Republic (see Table 7 below) (OECD, 
2012).  
 
Table 7: OECD Projected average annual growth rate in GDP and GDP per capita in 
USD 2005 PPP, percentage, 2011-30 
No change in 
labour force 
participation 
rate  (LFPR) 
Male and 
female LFPS 
gap reduced 
by 50% by 
2030 
Male and 
female LFPS 
gap reduced 
by 75% by 
2030 
Male and 
female LFPS 
gap reduced 
by 100% by 
2030 
 
GDP per capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
OECD 1.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Austria 1.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Belgium 1.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Czech Republic 2.6 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Denmark 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Estonia 3.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Finland 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 
France 1.7 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Germany 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.5 
Greece 1.7 0.4 0.7 0.9 
Hungary 2.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Ireland 1.6 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Italy 1.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 
Luxembourg 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Netherlands 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Poland 2.7 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Portugal 1.6 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Slovak 
Republic 2.9 0.3 0.5 0.7 
Slovenia 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 
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No change in 
labour force 
participation 
rate  (LFPR) 
Male and 
female LFPS 
gap reduced 
by 50% by 
2030 
Male and Male and 
female LFPS female LFPS 
gap reduced gap reduced 
by 75% by by 100% by 
2030 2030 
 
GDP per capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
Increase in 
GDP per 
capita 
Spain 1.9 0.3 0.5 0.6 
Sweden 1.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 
United 
Kingdom 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Source: OECD Secretariat’s estimates based on OECD Economic Outlook, NO.91 long term database (Version 6, 
June 2012), OECD, cited in Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now, OECD, 2012 
 
The Institute for Women’s Policy Research in the United States also commented on a 
Study conducted by the American Association of University Women in 2010, that if the 
GPG were to close in the United States, the stimulus effect would grow the US economy 
by at least three or four % (cited in Huffington Post Politics, 24 October 2010). Similarly, 
the Economist in the UK reported in November 2011 that Goldman Sachs had calculated 
that eliminating the remaining GPG between male and female employment rates could 
increase GDP in America by a total of 9 % and in the Euro Zone by 13 % (Economist, 2011 
Closing the gap, 26 November 2011). 
 
Studies from the UK, also suggest that reducing the GPG would have a positive impact 
on economic performance. The Women and Work Commission (2009) estimated that 
factors such as gendered job segregation, the lack of part-time roles in senior positions 
and pay discrimination contributes to the loss of between £15 and £23 billion or 1.3 to 2 % 
of GDP every year (Women and Work Commission, 2009).  
 
The Trade Union Congress (TUC) in the UK similarly used data from The Gender and 
Employment in Local Labour Markets project4 which found that 54 % of UK women 
employed part-time were ‘employed below their potential’, amounting to 2.8 million 
women (using figures from 2006), to suggest that if part-time jobs that paid £4 an hour 
more (the gap between hourly wages in full-time and part-time work) were available and 
women worked an average of 20 hours a week and 2.8 million women benefitted, the 
total increase in GDP would be £11.2 billion (TUC, 2008).  
 
An attempt to provide empirical evidence from South America, based on a Study by 
Costa and Silva (2008) states that“ gender inequalities act as barriers to pro-poor 
growth “, using examples from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Mexico. Using a 
simulated model where gender wage discrimination is eliminated in these countries, they 
                                            
4 Reported in Yeandle, S (2006) ‘Local Labour Markets and the GPG’, Paper to the European 
Sociological Association Interim Conference, Lisbon, 6 -8 September 2006  
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demonstrate that as a result women’s pay would increase and in Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico female earnings would even be higher than those of men because, on average, 
women in these countries are better qualified than men. This elimination of gender wage 
discrimination would contribute to greater economic growth and the conclusion is 
reached that “reducing gender inequalities implies benefits not only for women but also 
for men, children and the elderly, and for the poor as well as the rich.”(Costa & Silva 
2008:8). 
 
4.7 Groups affected by the GPG and the consequences of the pay 
gap 
Family situation and marital status are found to have a significant impact on the GPG 
(Belgian Presidency, 2010). The GPG is found to be larger for married women and 
increases further for married women with children, particularly in Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom (Belgian 
Presidency, 2010). This observation is however “less true of the new Member States 
where the widest gaps are often found among unmarried couples with a child/children” 
(Belgian Presidency, 2010: 76).  
 
The GPG is lower in one-person households in Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Sweden or unmarried couples without a child/children in Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the United Kingdom (Belgian 
Presidency, 2010). The pay gap is in favour of single women in Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, and Slovenia. It is in favour of married women without any children in Ireland and 
unmarried women in a relationship without children in Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal and Slovenia. The pay gap is also in favour of unmarried women in a relationship 
with a child/children in Austria, Spain, Italy and Portugal and women who are in single-
parent family situations in Austria, Cyprus, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. 
It favours women in other household situations in Hungary and Slovenia (“although some 
of the results should be interpreted with caution because the number of observations is 
low”) (all examples cited by Belgian Presidency, 2010).  
 
Cassells et al (2009) cite evidence from the United States, conducted by Jones et al (2003) 
who state that the working hours of married women increase when the GPG is reduced.  
Jones et al (2003, cited in Cassells et al, 2009) found that married women were “more 
sensitive to changes in the gender wage gap than single women”, finding that changes in 
the pay gap did not have a large effect on single women, but for married women “a small 
reduction in the gender wage gap generated a large labour supply response”, resulting in 
a move from unpaid work in the home to paid employment” (ibid.). Cassells et al, 2009, 
however, also cite evidence from Fitzpatrick and Lester 2009 which showed the opposite 
impact for “partnered women”, where an increase in earnings led to a decreased supply 
in labour (Fitzpatrick and Lester 2009, cited in Cassells et al, 2009). 
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In countries such as the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) the pay gap 
is widest among the highest qualified (Belgian Presidency, 2010). This can be attributed to 
school choices; career paths; the individual pay negotiations of women and men; more 
women taking career breaks and occupational segregation (Belgian Presidency, 2010). 
However, in Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, the 
opposite is found, with the pay gap narrower among the highest educated (ibid.). 
 
The GPG also has significant consequences “in a market-orientated” economy. Lower 
incomes for women put them at risk of poverty and female poverty is closely linked to 
child poverty. “Women’s earnings may therefore be critical in preventing child poverty, 
primarily in single, but also in dual earning families” (OFMDFM, 2010:17). Other 
consequences of the pay gap include the development of a pension gap, as pension 
contributions are commensurate with pay levels and labour market participation. The 
pay gap also creates a greater reliance on social support and welfare payments, with 
female poverty increasing women’s’ need for social assistance and other subsidised 
services such as healthcare, housing and child care (Moncton, 1996). There are also 
particular correlations between low incomes and poor health (ibid.): 
 
 “The most important result of pay equity would be the full integration of women 
into the economy. Under the current system, women are faced with discrimination in 
employment, low purchasing power, financial dependence on governments for 
income support, and the stresses of a life in which they are not given equal credibility 
with men. Society pays a high price for maintaining the current system of 
compensating women on a lower pay scale than men, a price that will only rise in the 
future as poverty claims more women through single parenthood and old age” 
(Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women and Canadian Human Rights 
Commission, cited in Moncton, 1996). 
 
4.8 Costs to employers  
Limited evidence was found in the secondary evidence review about the financial costs to 
employers derived from failure to provide equal pay. In the UK, the Government 
Equalities Office (2011) found that the cost to an employer of an equal pay case (based on 
prices in 2010) is £5,283. This cost per employer is the average per case, which could 
consist of multiple or single claimants. The report disaggregates this cost as follows: 
 Time spent on case by directors and senior staff: £1,912 
 Time spent on case by other staff: £550 
 Cost of advice and representation: £2,820 
 
The assessment also found that, according to the UK 2008 Survey of Employment 
Tribunal Applications,  the median compensation award for equal pay employment 
tribunal claims successful at tribunal is £13,411 (based on 2010 prices) (Government 
Equalities Office, 2011). In the UK, where equal pay claims are successful at hearings, this 
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can lead to the imposition of a pay audit. The Government Equalities Office’s impact 
assessment suggested an average cost per pay audit of approximately £8,800 (ibid.).  
 
4.9 Costs for lost productivity, low staff morale and loss of reputation  
The secondary evidence search and review found no quantitative evidence of the costs to 
employers of loss productivity, low staff morale and loss of reputation as a result of 
failure to provide equal pay. Some discussion of these issues was identified however, for 
example, in the UK, the EHRC (2011) highlight the potential high loss in business 
productivity linked to defending equal pay claims. This defence is “time consuming as 
HR and line managers have to gather evidence, communicate with legal representatives 
and attend tribunal hearings” (EHRC, 2011:4), which impacts on productivity levels. Low 
staff morale can also lead to further loss in business productivity if employees perceive 
that there is pay discrimination within the organisation, as a result of equal pay claims in 
their workplace (EHRC, 2011). A report by the Employer’s and Manufacturer’s 
Association in New Zealand also observed that addressing the gender wage gap is 
strongly associated with higher morale and job satisfaction (EMA, 2012). 
Equal pay claims in the workplace can also have a “negative impact on the business 
reputation, which could adversely affect the businesses ability to attract and retain the 
best employees” (EHRC, 2011). Loss of reputation can also impact customer attitudes and 
“ultimately the company’s commercial success”. Larger companies with shareholders 
also have an additional reputational risk (ibid.). 
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5. The Bauer Report  
 
In May 2012, the European Parliament adopted a legislative initiative report on Equal 
pay (Bauer report)5, calling on the Commission, among others, to review Directive 
2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, before February 
2013. In its official response to this report, the Commission has indicated that it does not 
intend to review the Directive to address the specificity of the causes for the current GPG 
within this deadline, but will instead draw up a report to be presented in the first half of 
2013, reviewing the practical implementation of this Directive at national level. 
 
The Bauer Report expressed concern relating to the European Commission’s lack of 
response to Parliament’s resolution of 18 November 2008, or to its resolution of 10 
February 2010 and matters reflected in the Council Conclusions on the European Pact for 
gender equality for the period 2011 – 2020.  
 
The report expressed further concern that in the past decade progress has only been 
achieved very slowly, that the wage differential between men and women has remained 
persistently high in recent years and that, despite the legally binding principle of equal 
pay for work of equal value, women’s hourly earnings in the EU-27 were on average 17.5 
% less than men’s for the same work in 2009 (up to 30% less in the private sector, equal 
merit and qualifications). 
 
The report goes on to highlight what it believes to be the nature and extent of the 
problem and sets out a series of challenges to the European Commission and Member 
States which in combination represents what it believes to be a coherent and structured 
set of policies to help reduce the GPG. In view of this response, the Committee on 
Women's Rights and Gender Equality requested an EAV assessment to be prepared as a 
follow-up and a strong additional justification to the legislative initiative report.  
 
In the following section the Research Team set out the recommendations of the Bauer 
Report that were set out in the Study terms of reference. Each recommendation is set out 
in terms of detail and a high level assessment is made based on available secondary 
evidence as to the potential that it has to positively impact on the GPG 
 
5.1 Recommendations of the Bauer Report 
The Bauer Report sets out the following nine policy recommendations: 
 
 Recommendation 1: Definitions 
 Recommendation 2: Analysis of the Situation and Transparency of Results 
 Recommendation 3: Work Evaluation and Job Classification 
                                            
5 Resolution with recommendations to the Commission on application of the principle of equal pay 
for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value 2011/2285(INI) 
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 Recommendation 4: Equality Bodies and Legal Remedy 
 Recommendation 5: Social Dialogue 
 Recommendation 6: Prevention of Discrimination 
 Recommendation 7: Gender Mainstreaming 
 Recommendation 8: Sanctions 
 Recommendation 9: Streamlining of EU Regulation and EU Policy 
 
The Study Terms of Reference requirement an assessment of the economic added value of 
the measures proposed in the Bauer report with a particular focus on the following five 
measures. In the following section we provide a précis of each option. 
 
Recommendation 2 (Option 1): Better analysis of the situation and transparency of results 
The Bauer Report stated that there is indication that regular pay audits and transparency 
have a series of positive effects as they improve talent development, the company's 
reputation and contribute to proper job evaluation- both internally and with relation to 
market forces.  
 
The lack of information and awareness among employers and employees about existing of 
possible pay gaps within their company as well as their ignorance weakens the 
implementation of the principle enshrined in the Treaty and in existing legislation. 
Acknowledging the lack of accurate, comparable and coherent statistical data, including on 
the part-time GPG and the gender pensions gap, and the existing lower pay rates for 
women especially across professions traditionally dominated by women, Member States 
should take full account of the GPG in their social policies and treat it as a serious problem. 
 
On this basis the option suggests regular pay audits, as well as the publication of their 
results, bearing in mind the personal data protection, are made compulsory within 
companies. The same requirement can also apply to information on remuneration in 
addition to pay. This information should be accessible to employees, trade unions and 
adequate authorities. Employers should provide employees and their representatives 
with results in the form of wage statistics, broken down by gender. This data should be 
compiled at sectoral and national level in each Member State. 
 
In addition the measures suggest that there should be a requirement on employers to 
adopt transparency policy in relation to wage composition and structures, including 
extra pay, bonuses and other advantages forming part of remuneration. Equally where 
wage statistics show group or individual differences in pay on grounds of sex, employers 
are obliged to analyse these differences further and react to eliminate them. 
 
Recommendation 3 (Option 2): Work evaluation and job classification 
The Bauer Report suggest that the concept of the value of work must be based on 
qualifications, interpersonal skills and responsibility emphasising quality of work, with 
the aim of promoting equal opportunities between women and men. This concept should 
not be marked by a stereotyped approach unfavourable to women, for example putting 
the emphasis on physical strength rather than on interpersonal skills and has to ensure 
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that work that involves responsibility for human beings is not considered of lower value 
than those with responsibility for material or financial resources. The proposal suggests 
that women must therefore be provided with information, assistance and/or training in 
wage negotiations, job classification and pay-scaling. It must be possible for sectors and 
companies to be asked to examine whether their job classification systems reflect the 
gender dimension in the required manner, and to make the necessary corrections. 
 
The Report states that a European Commission initiative should encourage Member 
States to introduce job classification complying with the principle of equality between 
women and men, enabling both employers and workers to identify possible pay 
discrimination based on a biased pay- scale definition. Respecting national laws and 
traditions concerning industrial relations systems remain important. Work evaluation 
and classification should also be transparent and be made available to all stakeholders 
and to labour inspectorates and equality bodies. 
 
At the level of Member States the report recommends that each Member State should 
carry out a thorough assessment centred on professions dominated by women. A gender-
neutral job evaluation should be based on new systems for classifying and organising 
staff and organising work and on professional experience and productivity assessed 
above all in qualitative terms, such as education and other qualifications, mental and 
physical requirements, responsibility for human and material resources, for use as a 
source of data and assessment grids for determining pay, with due regard to the principle 
of comparability. 
 
Recommendation 4 (Option 3): Equality bodies and legal remedies 
This option is focussed on enhancing the mandate of equality bodies, namely by 
reinforcing their legal powers to initiate investigations and impose sanctions, contribute 
to providing women with more efficient (i.e. more accessible and ideally at a lower cost) 
legal remedies.  
 
The recommendation is based on the principle that equality promotion and monitoring 
bodies should play a greater role in diminishing GPG. The report asserts that bodies 
should be empowered to monitor, report, and, where possible, enforce gender equality 
legislation more effectively and more independently while they should be adequately 
funded. Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC should be revised so as to enhance the 
bodies’ mandate by: 
 
 supporting and advising victims of pay discrimination; - providing independent 
surveys concerning the pay gap; 
 publishing independent reports and making recommendations on any issue 
relating to pay discrimination; 
 legal powers to initiate their own investigation; 
 legal powers to impose sanctions in cases of breaching the principle of equal pay 
for equal work and/or to bring wage discrimination cases to court; and 
 providing special training for the social partners and for lawyers, judges and 
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ombudsmen based on a toolbox of analytical instruments and targeted measures 
to be used either when drawing up contracts or when checking whether rules 
and policies to address the pay gap are being implemented, as well as providing 
training courses and training materials on non- discriminatory job evaluation for 
employers. 
 
Recommendation 8 (Option 4): Sanctions 
Under Directive 2006/54/EC, Member States are already obliged to introduce measures 
providing compensation or reparation (art. 18), as well as penalties (art 25) for failure to 
implement equal pay. The Study examines in what way (to what extent and using which 
modalities) has this requirement been implemented in Member States' national legal 
systems.  
 
The Bauer Report stated that it is important that Member States take the necessary 
measures to ensure that infringement of the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value is subject to appropriate sanctions according to the legal provisions in force. The 
Report goes on to state that in spite of the existing legislation, inspections and punitive 
action are often woefully inadequate where the principle of equal pay is concerned. The 
Report asserts that these matters need to be treated as a priority, and the agencies and 
bodies responsible for them must be provided with the necessary technical and financial 
resources. 
 
The Report contends that provisions included in Directive 2006/54/EC on compensation 
and on penalties are not sufficient to avoid infringement of the equal pay principle. The 
Report concludes by suggesting consideration of: 
 
 penalties, which must include the payment of compensation to the victim; 
 administrative fines (for example in the event of failure of notification or of 
compulsory communication or unavailability of analysis and evaluation of wage 
statistics disaggregated by gender (according to Recommendation 2)) requested 
by labour inspectorates or the competent equality bodies; 
 disqualification from public benefits, subsidies (including EU funding managed 
by Member States) and public procurement procedures, as already provided for 
by Directives 2004/17/EC1 and 2004/18/EC2 concerning the procurement 
procedure; and 
 identification of offenders, which should be made public. 
 
Recommendation 9 (Option 5): Streamlining of EU regulation and EU policy 
A wage penalty appears to be linked to working part-time. The paper will examine the 
scale and the economic implications of this phenomenon for women.  
 
The Bauer Report stated this to be an area for urgent action given that a wage penalty 
appears to be linked to working part-time. The Report suggests both an evaluation and 
possible revision of Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the 
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Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC - 
Annex: Framework agreement on part-time work, which prescribes equal treatment 
between full-time and part-time workers as well as more targeted and effective actions in 
collective agreements. 
 
The Report concludes by arguing for a concrete target for reducing the pay gap in the 
Employment Guidelines, inter alia, regarding access to vocational training and 
recognition of women’s qualifications and skills. 
 
5.2 Implementation of Bauer Recommendations in Member States 
In order to make an assessment of the potential for the recommendations set out in the 
Bauer Report to positively impact on the GPG it is necessary to establish a baseline for 
their current take up within Member States. Within the scope of the Study it is not 
possible to do this is a quantified form and Table 8 below indicates the countries that 
have implemented particular policies linked to the individual Bauer recommendations, 
based on the reviewed secondary evidence. The scope of the policies, however, differs 
significantly from one country to another. 
 
The colours in the table indicate the following: 
 Green: The Member State has made significant development in this area and 
translated policy linked to the indicated Bauer recommendation into mandatory, 
legislative requirements  
 Yellow: There has been partial development in the Member State in the indicated 
policy area, perhaps including some focused effort by the social partners. 
 Red: In the reviewed secondary evidence no references were found to policy 
actions in the area linked to the Bauer recommendation. 
 
The coding is based on the evidence identified from the list of sources set out in Annex 1. 
It is important to note that where evidence of significant or partial development in a 
policy area linked to the Bauer recommendation is identified within a Member State, it 
does not interpret whether the policy is effectively implemented or whether compliance 
is achieved.  
 
Table 8: Countries that have implemented policies linked to Bauer recommendations 
Member 
State 
GPG 
(Whole 
economy) 
% 
1.  
Improved 
situational 
analysis and 
transparency 
of results 
(recom.2) 
2.  
Work 
evaluation 
and job 
classification 
(recom.3) 
3. 
Equality 
bodies 
and legal 
remedies 
(recom.4) 
4. 
Sanctions 
(recom.8) 
5. 
Streamlining 
of EU 
regulations 
and EU 
policy 
(recom.9) 
Austria 23.7*      
Belgium 10.2      
Bulgaria 13.0      
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Member 
State 
GPG 
(Whole 
economy) 
% 
1.  
Improved 
situational 
analysis and 
transparency 
of results 
(recom.2) 
2.  
Work 
evaluation 
and job 
classification 
(recom.3) 
3. 
Equality 
bodies 
and legal 
remedies 
(recom.4) 
4. 5. 
Sanctions Streamlining 
(recom.8) of EU 
regulations 
and EU 
policy 
(recom.9) 
Cyprus 16.4*      
Czech 
Republic 
21.0 
     
Denmark 16.4      
Estonia  27.3%      
Finland 18.2*      
France 14.7*      
Germany  22.2*      
Greece  :      
Hungary  18.0      
Ireland 
13.9 
(2010) 
     
Italy 5.8      
Latvia 13.6      
Lithuania 11.9      
Luxembourg 8.7*      
Malta 12.9      
Netherlands 17.9      
Poland 4.5      
Portugal 12.5      
Romania 12.1      
Slovakia 20.5      
Slovenia 2.3      
Spain 16.2*      
Sweden 15.8      
United 
Kingdom 
20.1 
     
(*) Provisional   (:) Data unavailable 
 
The table above shows that, for the most part, there is currently no clear connection 
between the countries that have implemented particular policies linked to the individual 
Bauer recommendations and the size of the GPG. Italy is the exception here, with a whole 
economy GPG of 5.8 %, which is third lowest GPG amongst the Member States (behind 
Slovenia and Poland) and evidence of significant development in four of the Bauer policy 
areas. Austria, which has also made significant development across four of the five Bauer 
policy areas, conversely has the second highest GPG in Europe at 23.7% (behind Estonia 
at 27.3%). This may be attributable to the level of enforcement and compliance against the 
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policy areas or other factors at play within the Member States (such as the female 
employment rate).   
 
5.2.1 Option One (Recommendation 2): Improved situational analysis and 
transparency of results 
Policies linked to income transparency; increasing the availability of data and wage 
statistics; and preparation of comparative wage reports are particularly evident in 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden 
(all coded green).   
 
Belgium 
 
Narrowing the GPG is one of the priorities of the Belgian government in the equality 
field. Companies are required by law to produce an annual report on gender equality, 
which must be presented to the works council or trade union representatives. In March 
2012, the Belgian parliament passed new legislation that obliges companies to report on 
rates of pay for men and women. Specifically, companies with more than 50 employees 
are now required to: 
 
 report the wages of male and female employees in the ‘social balance sheet’ that all 
Belgian companies are required to include in their annual accounts 
 draw up an analysis of their pay structure every two years. This analysis must be 
submitted to the company’s works council and include wages, social benefits, 
supplementary insurances and other fringe benefits, measured as full-time 
equivalents, broken down by gender, blue/white-collar status, job level, seniority 
and level of qualification 
 appoint a mediator (such as a union representative) within the company, who can 
independently search for a solution if any employee thinks they are a victim of wage 
discrimination. 
 
In the case of companies with fewer than 50 employees, sectoral joint committees will be 
required to develop measures such as gender-neutral job function classifications. These 
will be submitted to the Federal Public Service for Employment, Labour and Social 
Dialogue which will assess them against the existing checklist for gender neutrality in 
job evaluation and classification, developed by the Institute for the Equality of Women 
and Men, which is a Federal Public Institute created to guarantee and promote the 
equality of women and men. 
 
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory 2012 
 
Countries such as Austria and Denmark have implemented particular requirements on 
employers to deliver gender specific data, at regular intervals to national authorities 
(Foubert, 2010). For example, in Austria employers must produce income reports every 
two years, showing average/median pay by occupational category and gender and 
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failure to do so can result in the company being publically named on the website of the 
Ministry for Women’s Affairs. Legislation in Denmark also requires employers with more 
than 35 staff to report wage statistics broken down by gender to the Statistical Bureau. 
Similarly, in Belgium and France organisations with over 50 employees must legally 
conduct a comparative analysis of the wages of men and women. In Italy, similar 
obligations fall on organisations employing more than 100 staff, with a requirement to 
conduct the analysis every two years. In Sweden, legislation requires employers with 25 
or more staff to conduct a pay survey every three years and employers with ten or more 
staff to prepare an annual equal opportunities plan which contains a wage survey of 
gender pay differences and measures to remedy any inequalities. In Finland, employers 
with 30 or more employees must also produce an equality plan including an analysis of 
pay differentials between men and women’s jobs. Foubert et al (2010) stated that the 
mandatory reporting requirements that exist in Austria, Finland, France, Italy and 
Sweden could “serve as good practices” to other Member States. 
 
Mandatory equal pay plans required by employers in Finland, Sweden and Spain are also 
viewed as good practices (Foubert et al, 2010). The Foubert et al (2010) Study found there 
to be a “recurring call for legislation obliging employers to publish detailed information 
regarding wages paid and other advantages given to employees within the company” 
(Foubert et al, 2010).  
 
Sweden 
 
In Sweden, all organisations with 25 or more employees must by law carry out a wage 
mapping exercise every three years. The aim of this exercise is to detect whether any part 
of wage differentials is based on gender. It consists of mapping, analysis and the 
formulation of an action plan. If the mapping exercise shows that there are wage 
differentials based on gender, and the analysis shows that part of these is related to 
gender, the employer must take action to reduce the wage gap. In addition, the employer 
must make an action plan to prevent future gender-related wage differentials. This report 
or document must also be delivered to the relevant authorities as it will be used for 
follow-up studies in the future. So far, the results are that knowledge about wage 
structures in all enterprises in Sweden is much better today than it used to be. However, 
employer response to this obligation is below 100%, and this is probably due to a lack of 
direct sanctions. In addition, as yet the gender wage gap in Sweden is unchanged, 
remaining at approximately 15 percentage points. 
 
Source: Åsa Löfström, Umeå University, Department of Economics, Swedish paper for the 
conference, Exchange of good practices on gender equalitiy. Reducing the GPG (Berlin, 5-6 
December 2011) 
 
Policies more broadly aligned to awareness raising are evident in Cyprus, where 
legislation encourages employers to provide employees with equal pay information, 
including pay differentials, at agreed intervals.  Similarly, in Spain GPG policies are 
contained in framework agreements with the social partners alongside legislation 
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requiring companies with 250 employees or more to negotiate equal pay plans. And in 
the UK, pay secrecy clauses are now unenforceable following the Equality Act 2010. 
Foubert et al (2010) observed that “when the ban on releasing pay information is 
loosened, it always seems to happen in the public sector first”. Foubert observed this 
example in Latvia (Foubert, 2010), however, in the UK the ban on secrecy clauses applies 
to both the public and private sector.   
 
Analysis and transparency tools are being used in countries such as Germany and 
Luxembourg (both coded yellow) (through the Logib programme), through which 
companies can voluntarily analyse their wage systems to uncover any GPGs. Similarly, in 
the Netherlands the ‘Wage Indicator’ (Loonwijzer) project attempts to share and compare 
wage information and the ‘Equal Pay Quick Scan’ software, also from the Netherlands, 
enables the analysis of company pay data to determine if an investigation into the 
payment system is required. 
 
The Logib tool – Switzerland, Austria and Germany 
 
The Logib tool (Lohngleichheit im Betrieb – Pay Equality in Companies) is a software tool 
consisting of a number of modules that build upon each other. It allows companies to 
identify differences in pay through self-assessments of pay equality on a voluntary basis. 
This tool was originally developed in Switzerland and is also used in Germany and 
Austria.  After entering the pay levels and qualification characteristics of female and male 
employees, this web-based tool provides a standardised report on the results in PDF 
format for printing. This includes an extensive equality-oriented analysis of pay 
structures and, thus, an analysis of the wage gaps within the company or organisation, 
both unadjusted and adjusted. The reports on the results produced by the web-tool 
display any wage gap on a “gender-pay-gap clock” with the indication of GPG extent 
(from less than 5% to more than 25%). The calculations can be undertaken both for a 
company on the whole as well as for specific different company locations or departments. 
 
Source: Summary paper for the conference, Exchange of good practices on gender equalitiy. 
Reducing the GPG (Berlin, 5-6 December 2011) 
 
The secondary evidence review also found evidence from a survey conducted by the 
Lehman Brothers Centre for Women in Business at London Business School, in 2007. It 
analysed practices which have a gender implication across 61 organisations, operating in 
12 European countries. One intervention identified by the research, was ‘measurement 
and reporting’; which is broadly reflective of Bauer’s second recommendation. These 
measures included progression (e.g. measuring and reporting on the career development 
of women at various stages); salary differences; the representation of women in senior 
roles; and the measurement and reporting of women’s turnover rates (Lehman Brothers, 
2007). The survey found that some 72% of organisations surveyed measured the 
proportion of women at key job levels and 66% measured the salary differences between 
men and women. The report stated that “in this way, it appears that many organisations 
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are laying good foundations for tracking the progression and equality of the women they 
employ” (Lehman Brothers, 2007).  
 
5.2.2 Option Two (Recommendation 3): Work evaluation and Job 
Classification 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands (coded green) were identified in the secondary 
evidence review as making the most significant developments in this policy area, beyond 
legal instruments declaring job classification systems should be gender neutral. In Belgium, 
a national agreement established that by 2016 all job classifications should be gender 
neutral to reduce the GPG and sector joint committees have been ensuring job 
classifications comply with the principle of gender equality through use of the EVA 
(Evaluation Analytique/analytische EVAluatie). In Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, 
the social partners also appear to have made significant efforts in the area of gender neutral 
job classification in order to address income differences between men and women.   
 
Belgium 
 
Belgian national collective agreement number 25 on equal pay between men and women 
(last modified in 2008), which has binding legal status, encourages the social partners to 
integrate a gender-neutral approach to job classification. It states that job evaluation 
systems must by 2016 ensure equal treatment between men and women in terms of the 
criteria they use, the weighting of these criteria and the way in which they are 
implemented into remuneration. Those sectors and companies that have not yet 
evaluated their job evaluation and pay systems in terms of gender neutrality should do 
so and make any necessary adjustments (Article 3). The national collective agreement 
notes that some sectoral agreements in Belgium are indeed in need of revision in this 
area, while others do not have any provision for gender-neutral work evaluation and job 
classification. It also notes that all pay systems need to be transparent if they are to ensure 
gender neutrality. 
 
Source: Belgian national collective agreement 25 
 
Other developments in this policy area include the provision of guidelines/training on 
non-discriminatory analytical job evaluation, prepared by the state or social partners. 
This activity is apparent in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (these countries have been coded yellow, 
unless further evidence was available). For example, in Austria a manual on job 
evaluation and wage differentials was produced by the Minister of Women and Civil 
Service in 2011, with cooperation from the social partners and in the Netherlands a guide 
on a gender neutral job evaluation was sent to the 12 providers of the most frequently 
used job evaluation systems in the Netherlands.  
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Equal pay and equality at GDF Suez 
 
GDF Suez, the France-based energy and utilities multinational, formally signed in June 
2012 a European-wide agreement on equality between women and men with three 
European-level trade union federations. The company hopes that this agreement, which 
has been characterised as groundbreaking, will make a significant contribution to 
ensuring equal pay for work of equal value for men and women at every level of the 
company. The agreement was concluded between GDF Suez management and 
representatives of the European trade unions industrial, the European Federation of 
Public Service Unions (EPSU), and CEC European Managers (CEC). The overall aim of 
the agreement is to achieve equal opportunities and pay equality between women and 
men, and a better work-life balance for all. It sets out a range of specific measures and 
actions, principally aimed at: 
 
 changing thinking and behaviour, notably through social dialogue; 
 providing information for employees, managers, employee representatives and trade 
union organisations; 
 guaranteeing equal opportunities in recruitment, equality in career progression and 
equal access to vocational training; 
 encouraging women’s networking and mentoring, and better representation of 
women among employee and union representatives; 
 identifying and rectifying gender pay inequalities, and ensuring pay equality; 
 improving work–life balance for all employees; 
 preventing sexual harassment. 
 
The agreement’s concrete objectives include ensuring that, by 2016, women make up at least: 
 
 30% of employees recruited on open-ended contracts (women currently make up 
19% of the GDF Suez workforce); 
 25% of all executives with open-ended contracts. 
 
The agreement also requires the introduction of equality action plans at the level of 
individual GDF Suez group companies with more than 150 employees, and it says union 
and employee representatives must be consulted on these. The plans will cover the issues 
and objectives set out in the European agreement and must be jointly reviewed each year 
on the basis of a set of indicators contained in the agreement. 
A European-level commission, made up of the signatories, will review application of the 
agreement annually on the basis of an agreed set of equality indicators. 
 
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory, 2012. 
 
Large-scale work re-classifications concentrated in particular sectors of the labour market 
have occurred in countries such as Austria (social and health services), the Netherlands 
(health sector), Portugal (hotel and restaurants) and the UK (local government and health 
service).  
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5.2.3 Option Three (Recommendation 4): Equality bodies and legal remedies 
The role and ability of equality bodies/advisors to initiate investigations varies widely by 
country. In Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and 
the UK (coded green), for example, the equality bodies/advisors can initiate their own 
proceedings; however, in Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and 
Slovenia, the equality bodies are not able to initiate judicial proceedings (however, due to 
the equality bodies possessing other functions, these Member States have been coded 
yellow). Even where the equality bodies do have the authority to initiate investigations, 
this does not mean they always do so (Foubert et al, 2010). 
 
Ireland 
 
Although Ireland does not currently carry out any systematic collection of the GPG in the 
workplace, voluntary equality reviews and action plans in the workplace have been 
initiated by the national equality body, the Equality Authority. A methodology for 
assessing equality in private and public sector workplaces covers issues such as 
occupational segregation, pay inequalities, the position of women in different 
occupational groups in the workforce and flexible working time. This has been carried 
out in cooperation with the national social partners, IBEC for employers and ICTU for 
trade unions. The initiative was funded by the National Framework Committee on Equal 
Opportunities at the Level of the Enterprise established under the national partnership 
agreement Sustaining Progress (2003-2005). This also provided resources for independent 
equality auditors to carry out equality reviews and action plans. 
 
Source: Jane Pillinger, Irish paper for the conference, Exchange of good practices on gender equalitiy. 
Reducing the GPG (Berlin, 5-6 December 2011) 
 
In Bulgaria, the Commission on Protection against Discrimination can impose penalties 
for infringements of anti-discrimination law and in Austria, the Equal Treatment 
Commission has the authority to oblige an employer to prepare a report analysing male 
and female comparisons if it suspects discriminatory practices and if infringements are 
identified, the Commission can request this report in subsequent years. 
  
In Finland, the Equality Ombudsman can set a deadline for an employer to implement a 
pay mapping exercise and the Equality Board may, at the request of the Equality 
Ombudsman, impose a fine on the employer (Foubert et al, 2010) (for this reason, Finland is 
also coded green). In Hungary, the equality body can impose a fine if violation of equal pay 
is identified and they may be published on the equal body’s website which would have the 
consequence of the organisation being excluded from applying for public funding.  
 
Greece 
 
In 2009 a series of legislative amendments were passed, aimed at more effective 
implementation of existing legislation on equal pay for men and women for equal work. 
In particular, Law 38(I)/2009 was passed for the purpose of harmonising national 
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legislation with European legislation, notably Council Directive 2006/54/EC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation, and also for the purpose of complying 
with Article 20 of the revised European Social Charter. In this context, the new law 
transposes the content of the recast Directive 2006/54/EC, both with regard to the 
replacement of the definitions of the most basic clauses of the legislation – namely those 
relating to ‘direct discrimination’, ‘pay’ and ‘indirect discrimination’, and also in relation 
to the addition of new articles: 
 
 the obligation of the social partners to enter into social dialogue for the purpose of 
furthering the principle of equal pay between men and women; 
 the obligation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance as the competent 
authority to enter into dialogue with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which, 
according to their statutes, have a legal interest in helping to combat gender 
discrimination. The objective purpose of this dialogue is to promote the principle of 
equal pay for men and women. 
 
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory 2010 
 
5.2.4 Option Four (Recommendation 8): Sanctions 
Whilst the literature showed that most Member States have measures in place for non-
compliance with equal pay legislation, as set out by Directive 2006/54/EC, there was less 
evidence of countries explicitly implementing sanctions within their monitoring systems. 
The sanctions in place differ and explicit sanctions for failure to implement equal pay 
were found to be evident in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden (coded green).  
 
France 
 
Pressure to close the GPG has been increasing in France over the past decade. In 2001, 
legislation obliged companies to negotiate on the question of workplace gender equality. 
In 2006, this obligation was extended in order to eradicate the wage gap between men 
and women, but without any sanctions being imposed. Most recently, the law of 9 
November 2010, reforming the pension system, included a penalty of up to 1% of the 
payroll costs for companies with at least 50 employees that had not met their 
responsibilities to reduce the pay gap by 1 January 2012.  
 
Further, companies with at least 50 employees must by law negotiate a collective 
agreement or draw up a unilateral action plan in consultation with employee 
representatives. Failure to comply will result in sanctions. The legislation not only 
stipulates the agenda for negotiations, but also compels the negotiators or company 
management to identify progress targets and the means of achieving them, and to put in 
place ways of measuring whether targets for narrowing the pay gap have been met. To 
support negotiations or the drawing up of an action plan, companies must compile an 
annual report on the comparative status of overall employment and training conditions for 
women and men. Companies that have fewer than 300 employees must draw up 
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agreements or action plans that include measures addressing at least two of eight topics 
listed in the guide, and at least three topics for companies with more than 300 workers. The 
topics are: recruitment; training; promotion; qualification and grading; working conditions; 
actual remuneration; work–life balance; dialogue with the administrative authority. 
Until now the negotiation of wage equality has been inadequate within the various 
sectors and even at company level, where this topic is rarely addressed specifically. It is 
hoped the fear of a penalty will have induced companies to introduce formal measures.  
 
Source: European Industrial Relations Observatory, 2011. 
 
Examples of existing sanctions include a warning fine of up to EUR 360 (source of data 
from 2012) in Austria for violation of the company obligations within the required 
income report. In France, companies which have not taken steps to close the GPG can be 
fined up to 1% of their payroll costs; in Italy a fine of between EUR516 to EUR1500 
(source of data from 2010) can be issued when violation of anti-discrimination law is 
detected and in Lithuania violation of equal pay can result in administrative fines of 
between EUR 35 and  EUR 1100 (source of data from 2010).  
 
Lithuania 
 
The Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsman in Lithuania, which has been functioning 
since 1999, is an independent state institution answerable to the Parliament, and one of 
the key institutions within the gender equality machinery. It takes overall responsibility 
for the supervision and implementation of the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men in Lithuania. The Ombudsman investigates individual complaints on gender 
discrimination and sexual harassment; submits recommendations and proposals to the 
Parliament, governmental institutions on the priorities of gender equality policy, 
including recommendations on amendments to relevant legislation. In cooperation with 
other offices the Ombudsman supervises mass media so that it does not place 
discriminatory advertisements and does not treat one gender as in any way superior or 
better in regard to the other. Additionally, the Ombudsman may participate at the 
interviews for a job and admission tests at educational institutions as an observer. The 
Office is actively working to raise public awareness on gender equality issues.  
 
The decisions of the Ombudsman in cases of discrimination on grounds of sex include the 
right to refer the material of the complaints to the pre-trial investigation bodies, and to 
address the institutions with a recommendation to discontinue the violations of the Law 
on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men.  
 
The Ombudsman has a right to investigate administrative cases and impose 
administrative sanctions for violations of the Law on Equal Opportunities for Women 
and Men, which is one of the most important and effective tools of the Lithuanian gender 
equality policy. Section 6, p. 1, of the Equal Opportunities Act of Women and Men states 
that violation of equal rights for women and men is sanctioned “according to the rules of 
administrative law”: the Administrative Penalties Act 408 imposes administrative fines of 
approximately EUR 35 to EUR 1100. 
 
Source: Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, Lithuania, Foubert et al, 2010 
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5.2.5 Option Five (Recommendation 9): Streamlining of EU regulation and 
EU policy 
Member States should have implemented legislation requiring equality between part-
time and full-time workers as set out in Directive 97/81/EC (part-time work). Policies 
which include specific gender considerations in part-time working legislation, as shown 
by the literature, were evident in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the UK also make legislative 
statements about payment for overtime for part-time workers (therefore these Member 
States have been coded green).  
 
United Kingdom 
 
The Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 
(amended in 2002) gave part-time workers a statutory right to be treated no less 
favourably than their comparable full-time colleagues. This meant that, in comparison 
with full-timers, part-time workers are entitled to:   
 
 the same hourly rate of pay,  
 the same access to company pension schemes,  
 the same entitlements to annual leave and maternity/parental leave on a pro rata basis,  
 the same entitlement to contractual sick pay, and  
 no less favourable treatment in access to training. 
 
The UK government states that less favourable treatment of part-time workers is not 
widespread in the UK. Nevertheless, where it does occur, it can affect a variety of terms 
and conditions, including pay, pensions, holidays and training, which was the reason 
behind the EU part-time work Directive, which is implemented in the UK by means of 
these Regulations. In the area of pay, the Regulations state that part-time workers must 
receive the same basic rate of pay as comparable full-time workers. They must not be 
given a lower hourly rate, unless justified by objective grounds. 
 
One example where a different hourly rate might be objectively justified would be a 
performance-related pay scheme. If workers are shown to have a different level of 
performance measured by a fair and consistent appraisal system this could justifiably 
result in different rates of pay. 
 
In general, the same principle applies to enhanced rates of pay. In special circumstances, 
special rates of pay apply. These may include bonus pay, shift allowances, unsocial hours 
payments or weekend payments. In these cases, part-time workers are entitled to the 
same hourly rate as a comparable full-time worker. 
 
Source: Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (UK government archived 
material website). 
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In Austria, part-time workers have a legal claim to premium rates of pay of an additional 
25% for overtime work. Foubert et al (2010) states that in Belgium, employers 
organisations have campaigned for the Federal Government to allow for more “flexible 
and cheaper overtime arrangements”; viewing the current legislation as “inflexible and 
expensive”. Foubert et al state that the Government has reduced taxes on overtime pay to 
address these pressures, however Foubert et al note that “making overtime easier and 
cheaper for employers entails the risk of negatively impacting those workers – mostly 
women – for whom the performance of overtime work clashes with e.g. family duties. 
Their pay will not be increased with overtime pay and, as a consequence, the GPG will 
rise” (Foubert et al 2010). 
 
Foubert et al (2010) also note that payment for women’s overtime work in Bulgaria is 
typically low in the sectors in which women dominate and recognise that when women 
receive additional pay for overtime worked, “this is usually part of the grey economy and 
thus not counted for social security purposes” (Foubert et al, 2010).  
 
Smith & Bettio (2010) comment that there is a clear negative economic impact and loss of 
productivity as a result of shorter working hours caused by higher levels of part-time 
work. Smith states that “shorter full-time working hours and higher levels of part-time 
work lead to lower recorded levels of GDP per capita in Europe compared to that in the 
United States”. Smith, however, also states that in Nordic countries where there is higher 
female labour market participation, this helps address this impact. For example, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden have some of the highest levels of female labour 
market participation but these also have among the highest part-time rates (European 
Commission, 2011). Smith & Bettio (2010) cite a Study by Elmeskov and Scarpetta (2000) 
which calculated that a “lower utilisation of labour contributes more than 20 percentage 
points to the gap in GDP per capita in the European Union compared to that of the 
United States“ (cited in Smith & Bettio, 2010). 
 
Ireland 
 
Under the Irish legislation, the Protection of Employees (Part-Time Work) Act 2001, there is 
provision for pro-rata entitlements with full-time employees. The Act states that if a 
condition of work is dependent on the number of hours worked by an employee, the 
extent to which that condition is provided to a part-time employee is related to the 
proportion that the normal hours of work of the part-time employee bears to the normal 
hours of the full-time employee. The conditions covered include remuneration, pensions, 
voluntary health contributions and access to sick pay.  
 
Further, the Irish Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Access to Part-Time 
Working) Declaration Order 2006 states that access to part-time work should, as far as 
possible, be available across different levels in the organisation. In addition, employers 
should, as far as possible, give consideration to requests by employees to transfer from 
full-time to part-time work, and to requests by employees to transfer from part-time to 
full-time work or to increase their working time, should the opportunity arise. The Code 
states that employees moving to part-time work should suffer no diminution of status or 
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employment rights generally, with the exception of pay, benefits as appropriate (unless 
there are objective grounds), and that the pro-rata principle should apply where 
appropriate.  
 
Source: Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act 2001; Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code 
of Practice on access to part-time working) (Declaration) Order 2006. 
 
Table 9: Countries that have implemented policies or made efforts in the policy area 
linked to each of the Bauer recommendations 
Bauer recommendation  Country  
Option One (Recommendation 2): 
Improved situational analysis and 
transparency of results 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, 
FI, FR, HU, IE, IT , LU, LT, LV, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SE, SI, SK, UK 
Option Two (Recommendation 3): Work 
evaluation and job classification 
AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, IT, LT, 
LU, MT, NL, PL,  PT, SE, SK, UK 
Option 3 (Recommendation 4): Equality 
bodies and legal remedies 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, 
FI, FR, HU, IE, IT , LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, 
PL, PT, RO, SE, SI,  SK, UK 
Option 4 (Recommendation 8): Sanctions AT, BE, BG, FI, FR, HU, IT, LT, PT, SE 
Option 5 (Recommendation 9): 
Streamlining of EU regulation and EU 
policy 
AT,BE, BG, CY, DE, ES, IE, IT, LV, PT, 
RO, SI, SK UK 
Note: This table includes those Member States where policies have been translated into mandatory 
requirements (coded green) AND the Member States where there has been partial development 
and some focused effort in the policy area (coded yellow).  
 
5.3 Interplay of Bauer Recommendations  
Each of the Bauer Report recommendations is focussed at a particular point in the policy 
process and is targeted at one of more stakeholder groups. As such it is possible to assess 
the extent to which combining one or more options may have a cumulative impact in 
excess to that of any one option. Again within the limited scope of this Study it is not 
possible to systematically assess this but in the following section we draw upon the 
secondary evidence review undertaken in relation to similar initiatives at a Member State 
level and make a qualitative assessment of the potential to gain a higher overall impact 
by combining measures set out in the Bauer Report. 
 
In Figure 2 below we have set out how different policy instruments come together to 
impact on the achievement of a particular policy goal. When related to the options under 
consideration from the Bauer Report it is apparent that each relates to a particular 
element of the Model set out below.  
 
Whilst some of the options set out in the Bauer Report maybe considered to be enforcing 
in nature in that they are focussed on rewards, sanctions and targets there are others 
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which can better be seen as being enabling or facilitating in that they serve to support the 
policy goal by providing for higher levels o information and greater levels of 
transparency.  
 
In assessing the five Bauer Recommendations that are the focus for this Study it is 
apparent that the enabling elements such as Option 1 on Transparency of Results can link 
to Option 4 on Sanctions to provide for a both a mix of options, but also for an interaction 
between options so that one may help to reinforce or underpin another. Whilst the Study 
has not been able to make any quantitative assessment of the potential additional impact 
of combining a number of policy options on the GPG and by association economic 
growth, it can be seen how their maybe such additional benefit. 
 
Figure 2: Model outlining the relationship between the Policy Options 
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5.4 Impact Analysis 
This section aims to provide an assessment of the potential impact of the measures 
outlined in the Bauer Report. It first outlines the evidence concerning impacts at national 
level associated with measures corresponding to the recommendations investigated as 
part of this Study, combines them with information concerning costs, and presents a 
simple cost-effectiveness analysis. The impact evidence is then combined with 
information concerning the baseline situation (presented in the previous sections) and 
information concerning compliance, to provide an assessment of the aggregate impact at 
country level. 
 
The estimation of potential impact has been made by ascribing a high, medium or low 
grading to each country based upon a combined assessment of the following: 
 
 Assessment on the potential of the measure to reduce the GPG; Options 1, 2 and 
5 rated ‘high’ options 4 ‘medium’ and option 3 ‘low’ 
 Level of the existing GPG within the Member State with higher levels suggesting 
higher scope to achieve a reduction assessed as under 10% rated ‘low’ 10-20% 
rated ‘medium’ and over 20% rated ‘high’; and 
 Current level of implementation of the initiative within the Member State where 
non-implementation provides higher scope to achieve a reduction. No evidence 
of implementation rates as ‘high’, some evidence ‘medium’ and strong evidence 
of having implemented a scheme equating to a ‘low’ potential for the particular 
Bauer recommendation to make additional benefit. 
 
In relation to Table 10 the grading has been made on the following basis: 
 
 Average score 3 ‘High’ (Light Green) 
 Average score 2.5 to 3 ‘high to medium’ (Green) 
 Average score 2 to 2.5 ‘medium to high’ (Dark Green) 
 Average score 2 ‘medium’ (Orange) 
 Average score 1.5 to 2 ‘medium to low’ (Dark Orange) 
 Average score 1 to 1.5 ‘low to medium’ (Light Red) 
 Average score 1 low (Red) 
 
For example in the case of Austria it has a high GPG (over 20%), there is evidence that it has 
made significant progress with options 1, 2, 4 and 5 and some progress with 3. This is set 
against the underlying potential of the options such that a ‘high’ GPG plus a ‘low’ already 
evidence of policy having been implemented and a high underlying potential for the 
measure to impact positively on the GPG producing an overall rating of 2.3 (Dark Green). 
 
Table 10: Potential Impact of proposed Measures on Member States  
Member State Measure 1. 
Transparency 
of Results 
Measure 2. 
Work 
Evaluation 
Measure 3. 
Equality 
Bodies 
Measure 4. 
Sanctions 
Measure 5.  
EU 
Regulations 
Austria 2 2.3 2 2 2.3 
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Member State Measure 1. 
Transparency 
of Results 
Measure 2. 
Work 
Evaluation 
Measure 3. 
Equality 
Bodies 
Measure 4. Measure 5.  
Sanctions EU 
Regulations 
Belgium 1.7 2 1.3 1.3 2 
Bulgaria 2 2.7 1.3 1.7 2 
Cyprus 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.3 
Czech 
Republic 
2.3 3 2 2.7 3 
Denmark 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.3 2.7 
Estonia 2.7 3 2 2.7 3 
Finland 1.7 2.3 1.3 1.7 2.7 
France 1.7 2.3 1.3 1.7 2.7 
Germany 2.3 2.7 2 2.7 2.7 
Greece* 2 3 1.5 2.5 3 
Hungary 2 2.7 1.3 1.7 2.7 
Ireland 2 2.7 1.3 2.3 2 
Italy 1.3 2 1 1.3 1.7 
Latvia 2 2.7 1.3 2.3 2.3 
Lithuania 2 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.7 
Luxembourg 1.3 2 1.3 2 2.3 
Malta 2.3 2.3 1.3 2.3 2.7 
Netherlands 2 2 1.7 2.3 2.7 
Poland 1.7 2 1.3 2 2.3 
Portugal 1.7 2.3 1.7 1.7 2 
Romania 2 2.7 1.7 2.3 2.3 
Slovakia 2.3 2.7 2 2.7 2.7 
Slovenia 1.7 2.3 1.3 2 2 
Spain 1.7 2.3 1.7 2.3 2 
Sweden 1.7 2.3 1.7 1.7 2.7 
United 
Kingdom 
2.3 2.7 1.7 2.7 2.3 
 
The previous analysis notwithstanding, another factor potentially influencing the 
effectiveness of the Draft Report is the rate of compliance, which in turn is based on two 
factors: 
 
 The first one is the degree to which a Directive based on the recommendations in 
the Bauer Report would be transposed in Member States.   
 The second factor concerns the degree to which companies in the various 
Member States implement it. In this regard, it is worthwhile looking at provisions 
on enforcement.  
 
It needs to be stressed that the remit of the Study did not extend to an examination of 
levels of compliance within and across Member States and as such there is the potential 
for over or under estimation of potential impact within Table 10 above.  
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-48
European Added Value of applying the principle of equal pay 
 
 
6. Economic Impact Assessment 
 
Following standard microeconomic theory, levels of wages of workers should correspond 
to their productivity. Different pay levels would be related to differences in workers' 
productivity, which are caused, among other things by differences in skill levels. Once all 
differences in human capital are controlled for, for example by adjusting for different 
levels of education of men and women and differences in work experience (caused by 
differences in labour market participation), the GPG should disappear or at least narrow.  
However, as we know from much of the evidence, a persistent GPG is still found once for 
such factors have been accounted for. This GPG suggests that discrimination on the basis 
of personal characteristics exists. Social science research has identified multiple 
mechanisms that may cause the GPG, such as occupational segregation, dysfunctional 
social policy (which, for example, fails to offer adequate childcare) or further 
discrimination through differences in unionisation or job-role traditions.  
 
Since Becker's original work (1957), we know that wage discrimination, which is 
unrelated to productivity differences caused by the heterogeneity of labour, reduces 
economic efficiency in the longer term because firms that do not discriminate tend to 
achieve a higher marginal product of labour and are more productive. This 
microeconomic mechanism allows us to derive clear long-term costs relating to 
discrimination, in particular due to the fact that a persistent GPG reduces output in the 
economy because of suboptimal allocation of labour in production. In addition, there are 
further mechanisms that additionally reduce economic output in the longer term: 
reduced investment in firms because they have lower productivity compared to a 
counterfactual world without discrimination, adverse effects on skills acquisition, labour 
force participation and working times for women, lower fertility rates, etc. 
 
All these mechanisms suggest that long-term economic performance is higher in 
economies that set up mechanisms to achieve a narrower GPG/eradicate it. Welfare 
measures (such as GDP per capita) should be growing at consistently higher rates in 
countries with a low GPG compared to those with a large one when further 
characteristics such as the development of factors of production (capital stock/labour 
input at various skills/work experience levels) and general technical progress are 
controlled for.  
 
In the first main part of this chapter, we present a ceteris paribus (i.e. all other things being 
controlled for simultaneously) estimate of the effects of the GPG on GDP per capita growth 
using macroeconomic data for a panel of EU Member States (from Conference Board, OECD 
and Eurostat data), for which data on the GPG is available for a medium-term period.  
 
In the second part, the estimated impact of the GPG on economic growth is monetised 
using real 2012 $s adjusted for purchasing power parities based on the method by Éltető, 
Köves and Szulc (EKS PPP) in order to provide an estimate of the costs of the GPG to 
GDP. We then contextualise this effect size in the light of available estimates of the 
impact of various policy options to reduce the GPG by certain percentage points, for 
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which a body of evidence exists from qualitative research (including the Matrix report). 
For example, impact estimates of how much the GPG could be reduced if better 
transparency of wages existed could then be translated into related output effects and 
show how the relative options would make an impact on GDP per capita. 
 
We hope that our discussion of these findings helps to assess the differential output effects, 
which could be achieved in the EU if specific policies, for example those summarised under 
the Bauer recommendations, were consistently implemented across the EU. 
 
6.1 Our approach 
In our approach, we followed the Study by Cassells et al. (2009) on the quantitative 
impact of wage discrimination on GDP per capita growth in Australia, estimated on the 
basis of time series data, which was subsequently valued at market prices to show the 
costs of a persistent GPG in terms of foregone output. Implicitly, such estimates show 
how much higher social wealth would be if the GPG declined.  
 
Similar to Cassells et al. (2009), we estimate a human-capital augmented growth model to 
obtain a ceteris paribus effect on how much a persistent gender wage gap reduces 
economic growth in the EU. We use data from the Conference Board, the OECD and the 
European Labour Force Survey countries in order to construct a macroeconomic panel 
data set of (most) EU countries over the past 10 years, with monetary values adjusted to 
constant prices and purchasing power parity. The empirical design benefits from the 
variation of the GPG and economic growth across countries and over time. Using 
regression models, we explain how:  
 
 Dependent variables (GDP per capita or GDP per person employed as differences 
in logs) are explained by a set of  
 Independent variables (investment, population growth, employment, total hours 
worked in the economy, human capital stock in logs as required for the 
estimation empirical growth models and a level measure for the country's GPG). 
 
Assuming that a persistent gender wage gap results in economic inefficiency, a linear 
estimation of the effect of the GPG on differences in logged dependent variables provides 
an empirical estimate of the impact of the gender wage gap on the economic growth rate 
(similar to Seguino 2000). 
 
We are aware that our dependent variable represents an imperfect indicator for the 
economic outcomes of reducing the GPG. GDP per capita only includes activities that can 
be valued at market prices and are observed consistently across time and countries. In 
contrast, economic activity taking place in households, for example looking after the 
children or some kind of home production, is not valued in national accounts.  
 
However, these activities are likely to be reduced as female labour supply increases 
because of a smaller/eradicated GPG. With less time for home production available to 
women, households would resource more consumption from markets instead of home 
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production. Therefore, some of the observed increase in output would only represent 
substitution in household consumption patterns, but not a true gain in household wealth 
as such activities were just excluded from the formal economic system. The output 
increase would partially represent a substitution and not a genuine increase in economic 
activity. The estimated ceteris paribus effect of reducing the GPG would therefore 
overstate the true economic impact. In the context of this Study, we will not be able to 
control for such effects.  
 
6.2 Outline Economic Model 
We estimate an augmented Solow growth model using a dynamic panel data model for a 
total number of n countries and t time periods observed. The basic specification of the 
Solow growth model we use here is similar to that presented in Bond et al. (2001) 
although most empirical estimates we know of have a similar or identical form. 
Following Bond et al. (ibid.), we model our growth equation as: 
 
  itiittitit xyy    '1 1,  for i=1,…N and t=2,…,T  (1) 
 
where is the log difference in per capita GDP over a five year period, 
1, ti
is the 
logarithm of per capita GDP at the start of this period and is a vector of characteristics 
measured during the period.  
ity y
itx'
 
The specific form of the Solow model requires inclusion of the logarithm of the 
investment rate ( ), which we model on the basis of reported savings rates from the 
World Bank, and the logarithm of the growth rate of the population (i) plus 0.05, where 
0.05 represented the sum of exogenous technical change (g) and a depreciation rates (). 
The augmented model as proposed in the original contribution by Mankiw et al. (1992) 
additionally includes a measure for the human capital stock in the economy, which in 
their Study was expressed as the logarithm of the secondary-school enrolment rate (enrit). 
In our estimates, we specify human capital stock as the percentage share of people in the 
working-age population who achieved at least level four according to the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED4). This is a measure for people in the 
working age population with either a full vocational or academic education following the 
end of mandatory secondary schooling.  
its
 
In addition, the specification as a panel data model further implies that unobserved 
country-specific effects (i), which capture differences in the initial level of efficiency and 
period-specific intercepts 
t , which capture productivity changes that are common to all 
countries.  
 
6.3 Impact of the gender wage gap on growth 
We extend this basic model by further specifying that economic efficiency varies across 
countries by specific level parameters i and the specific impact of a country's gender 
wage gap on economic efficiency, which enters the form in an additive-separable way as 
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suggested by Cassells et al. (2009) and Seguino (2000). The augmented Solow model then 
becomes: 
  itiitittitit Wgapxyy    '1 1,  for i=1,…N and t=2,…,T 
  
 with 

 
it
itit
it wm
wfwmWgap  
expressing the unadjusted gender wage gap, which is calculated as the difference 
between median earnings of men and women relative to median earnings of men. As is 
the standard in this literature, median earnings are related to wages and salaries in full-
time work for dependent employment, i.e. avoiding differences, which could be caused 
by differences in working times and the larger share of women working in part-time 
employment compared to men. This should at least mitigate some of the differences 
between working-times of men and women, although the OECD acknowledges that men 
tend to work on average longer hours than women even when restricting the gap to full-
time employees.6 
 
We are aware of the problem that the unadjusted gender wage gap does not account for 
the specific characteristics of the employment structure in the different countries and that 
the gender wage gap is usually wider for people at lower formal education levels than for 
people with post-secondary education, at least for younger cohorts in the labour market.7  
However, we do not know of consistent time-series data on the adjusted gender wage 
gap available for a larger sample of OECD or EU Member States and therefore rely on 
this sub-optimal measure. We do however believe that our model can at least address 
part of this weakness by including the percentage shares of people at least qualified to 
ISCED4 levels, which enter the form as the stock measure for human capital. 
 
6.4 Empirical specification 
In addition to the gender wage gap and differential levels in human capital, we further 
include variables to account for differences in growth caused by country-specific labour 
market participation patterns. This is especially relevant in the context of Europe, where 
employment and working time differs markedly, with higher working time in the formerly 
communist Central and Eastern EU Member States and lower working time in the 
continental economies of the west (in particular the Netherlands, Germany and France).  
 
As was discussed in Cassells et al. (2009), this extension is necessary to separate the 
impact of general population growth on GDP per capita growth from the impact of 
changes in labour participation and changes in working times.  
 
                                            
6 http://www.oecd.org/std/37964069.pdf 
7 See also: Table LMF1.5.A: Average annual earnings of females as a percentage of males by level of 
educational attainment and age-cohort, 2008 or latest year available. 
http://www.oecd.org/social/family/LMF1.5%20Gender%20pay%20gaps%20for%20full%20time
%20workers%20-%20updated%20081212.pdf 
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The final specification of the model we estimate is:  
 
  tiiitititititittitit Wgaphpllfphknsyy ,543211,1   
(2) 
 with the vector of in-period covariates xit in addition to the parameters  
 described in relation to equation (1) now fully specified as: 
  logarithm of the investment rate 
its
 itn logarithm of the growth rate of the population plus 0.05  
  logarithm of the share of the working-age population with at least  
  ISCED4 
ithk
  logarithm of employment to population ratio 
itlfp
  logarithm of the average hours worked per person employed. 
ithpl
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables entering this form are presented in Table 11, as well 
as in Table 17 and Table 18 in the Appendix for some selected years. As can be seen from 
these descriptives, the specification finally estimated is restricted to countries of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) as information on the human capital stock (ISCED4 as 
percent of total working-age population) was obtained from micro data of the European 
Labour Force Survey (ELFS) is only available for these countries and for the period 2002-
2011. Our country panel is further reduced by the GPG variable, which is currently only 
available for a subset of EEA countries, representing primarily the pre-2004 EU (EU15), 
the non-EU Member States of the EEA and Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics.  
 
In addition, the nature of the time series information is "unbalanced", which implies that 
some of the time series (for example for the Netherlands) do not cover the full time-
period as for example data for the UK, which is available for the full range between 2002 
and 2010 used for this analysis. Since the form is estimated for t=2,…,T as the initial level 
effect at the beginning of the period estimated enters the equation as a regressor, the 
unbalanced panel is estimated for a maximum of eight years per country (like in the UK), 
but in some countries for fewer years. 
 
6.5 Estimation 
We estimate the model represented in (2) in two different estimates, specifying the vector 
of covariates xit as either a) annual average values for each period of five years (Caselli et 
al. 1996) or b) as levels related to the specific year (Mankiw et al. 1992, Bond et al. 2001). 
We also estimate the models for two different dependent variables, either a) the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parities based on the method by 
Éltető, Köves and Szulc (EKS PPP)8 in real values as of 2012 or b) the GDP in 2012 EKS 
PPP per person employed, which was obtained by multiplying the GDP per capita 
measure with the ration of population to employment (as in Canarella and Pollard 2003). 
The GDP per person employed represents a measure closer to productivity than GDP per 
capita and can to some extent control for the variation in labour market participation and 
demography across the sample.  
                                            
8 http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5525 
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As suggested by the final specification, we estimate the growth model using the dynamic 
panel data model method, i.e. with lagged levels of the dependent variable included as a 
right-hand side regressor. While such a modelling can capture country-specific dynamics 
better than static panel data models, such as fixed or random effects models, there are 
econometric problems of estimating models with lagged dependent variables as 
generally with models including sources of endogeneity.  We address this by estimating 
the dynamic panel data model using the estimator initially put forward by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), which has several advantages compared to static estimates of panel data: 
 
 First, the form represented in (2) is estimated in first differences, which implies 
that time-invariant country-specific level effects represented by 
i  cancel out 
similarly to a fixed effects model. 
 Second, by taking the first differences and allowing the levels of the xit to be 
correlated with unobserved country-specific fixed effects, the lagged first 
differences of xit and yit can be used as instruments in the level equations (see Bond 
et al. 2001). This property is specifically useful to the estimation of dynamic panel 
data models, which include a lagged dependent variable as a right hand side 
regressor (i.e. an "endogenous variable") as specified in (2). As a result of this, 
estimates obtained in OLS or Fixed/Random effects models would result in biased 
parameter estimates due to the correlation between one of the independent 
variables included in the model and the error term it9. The Arellano/Bond 
estimator benefits of the availability of lagged levels of dependent and 
independent variables, which can be used as instruments for the differences of 
right-hand side regressors included, exploiting the fact that they are not correlated 
with the error term of the model in first differences. Both lagged levels of the 
dependent variable yit-2 until the earliest available point in time as well as levels of 
other covariates xit for all periods before t-1 are used as instruments. 
 
6.6 Results 
We show the results of both specifications in Table 11 and Table 12 below. These 
estimates are qualitatively similar to what would be suggested by the standard empirical 
literature on Solow models: 
 The coefficient of the lagged output is negative and strongly significant in all models. 
 The sign of the savings rate is positive, albeit not significant. The sign of 
population growth is negative in two models, which is consistent the Solow 
model, but only significant in the final estimate specifying xit as in-period levels. 
 Consistent with Mankiw et al. (1992) and further augmented Solow models, 
human capital stock has a positive and significant effect on growth in all models. 
 Consistent with the modelling of the dependent variables as either GDP per 
capita or GDP per person employed, labour force participation growth either 
significantly increases or decreases growth, while growth in working times per 
person employed have generally positive impact. 
                                            
9 Note that this affects only typical panel where N is (relatively) large, but the number of periods T 
is small.  A long time series would not suffer the same source of bias. 
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Table 11:  Specification 1* 
 Model 1: GDP per capita Model 2: GDP per person 
employed 
 Coef. Std. Err. P Coef. Std. Err. P 
yi,t-1 -0.5111 0.0525 0.0000 -0.4649 0.0576 0.0000 
sit 0.0512 0.0381 0.1790 0.1050 0.0477 0.0280 
nit+0.05 0.1560 0.0905 0.0850 0.0812 0.0954 0.3950 
hkit 0.1053 0.0251 0.0000 0.1702 0.0290 0.0000 
lfpit 0.1383 0.0637 0.0300 -0.3807 0.0660 0.0000 
hplit 0.4767 0.1133 0.0000 0.4683 0.1200 0.0000 
Wgapit -0.0008 0.0006 0.2310 -0.0012 0.0008 0.1200 
Number of observations 125   125   
Number of groups 
(countries) 19   19   
Number of instruments  97   97   
Wald chi2(16)  2727   1075   
Prob > chi2  0   0   
* with savings and population growth specified as annual average values for five years periods before t as in 
Caselli et al. 1996. Specification includes dummy variables for years. Instruments are t-2 lags of all independent 
variables. 
Source: Conference Board Database, European Labour Force Survey, own calculations 
 
Table 12: Specification 2* 
 Model 1: GDP per capita Model 2: GDP per person 
employed 
 Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P Coef. Std. Err. P 
yi,t-1 -0.4204 0.0470 0.0000 -0.3845 0.0530 0.0000 
sit 0.0147 0.0189 0.4370 0.0123 0.0214 0.5660 
nit+0.05 -0.0587 0.0597 0.3260 -0.1208 0.0654 0.0650 
hkit 0.0882 0.0244 0.0000 0.1441 0.0275 0.0000 
lfpit 0.2562 0.0755 0.0010 -0.2135 0.0713 0.0030 
hplit 0.4961 0.1125 0.0000 0.4865 0.1162 0.0000 
Wgapit -0.0007 0.0007 0.2730 -0.0014 0.0008 0.0620 
Number of observations 125   125 125  
Number of groups 
(countries) 
19   19 19  
Number of instruments  97   97 97  
Wald chi2(16)  2819   1141 2819  
Prob > chi2  0   0 0  
*with savings and population growth specified as period specific levels in t as in Bond et al. 1996. Specification 
includes dummy variables for years. Instruments are t-2 lags of all independent variables. 
Source: Conference Board Database, European Labour Force Survey, own calculations 
 
Assessing the quality of the estimates we obtained, we conclude that specification two 
leads generally to more plausible estimates as the sign of population growth in both 
models of specification one is not consistent with Solow. We acknowledge that the impact 
of changes in savings rates is not statistically significantly different from zero, but we also 
note that the effect size is relatively small for the period, for which data are available.  
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6.7 Main finding 
Our preferred specification two also includes two estimates of the impact of the gender 
wage gap, which is negative. This is consistent with expectations as a persistent gender 
wage gap reduces economic efficiency. The only significant estimate found was related to 
the specification of growth of GDP per person employed. The size of the impact (-0.0014) 
suggests that a decrease in the gender wage gap by one percentage point would increase 
economic growth by 0.1 percent. This finding will be used in the following to illustrate 
the economic costs of the gender wage gap. More specifically, we will derive output 
increase, which could be achieved in the EU if measures causing specific reductions in 
the gender wage gap were introduced consistently across the EU.  
 
Our finding compares low relative to the impact of the gender wage gap on economic 
growth for Australia (Cassels et al 2009), which is about 0.25 percent of a reduction of the 
GPG by 1 percentage point. However, since our data only represent the early 2000s, a 
longer-term impact as for Australia is unlikely to show in our data. We also believe that 
underlying growth dynamics differ markedly between Australia and Europe, with 
generally lower economic growth in Europe, which would be a plausible explanation for 
the impact of reducing the GPG in Australia perhaps being higher. 
 
6.7.1 The economic impact of policies reducing the GPG 
Building on the above empirical estimation of the impact of the GPG on growth in the 
EU, the following section sets out to contextualise the above findings by providing some 
possible results stemming from the introduction of different policy options aimed at 
reducing the GPG.  
 
6.7.2 The potential economic impact of a reduction of the gender wage gap 
Although the issue of the GPG and its potentially negative economic impact have been 
widely discussed both among academics and policy makers, as yet, only very little material 
actually quantifies the effects of different policy options to reduce the GPG. A recent report 
conducted for the European Commission, however, has estimated the reduction of the GPG 
within the European Union resulting from a range of potential policy options, such as 
sanctions or streamlining of existing EU regulations (Matrix, 2011).  
 
Based on the estimates that have emerged from this chapter (see table 12, Model 2), 
together with a quantification of effects of different policy options, the following tables 
will illustrate the economic costs in terms of loss of output associated with the gender 
wage gap in Europe and an illustrative number of individual European Member States.  
 
Leaving aside any policy options implying voluntary steps taken by employers such as 
regular reporting on GPG issues or more generally introducing more transparency in 
wage setting and progression criteria – both measures frequently referred to in the 
literature – the following section focus on five specific policy recommendations based on 
the Bauer report.  
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-56
European Added Value of applying the principle of equal pay 
 
 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-57
6.7.3 The potential economic impact of selected Bauer recommendations  
Where introduced consistently across the EU, the five Bauer recommendations discussed 
in this paper, are likely to have a significant impact on economic output in the European 
Union. This is particularly the case for transparency of wages, reporting on the GPG and 
company level, and changes in the part-time work Directive (for each of these options, 
the GPG is estimated to be reduced by between two and three percentage points).  
 
Based on the estimated size of the impact (-0.0014) which suggests that a decrease in the 
gender wage gap by one percentage point would increase economic growth by 0.1 
percent, Table 13 shows the potential impact of selected Bauer recommendations. 
According to the policy impact indicated in Table 13, the Bauer recommendations would 
lead to a reduction of the gender wage gap of between one and three percentage points 
across the European Union. 
 
Having set out the potential impact of a reduction in the GPG on economic output in the 
EU, using aggregated numbers for growth in total GDP as well as in GDP per capita help 
to contextualise the potential output effect a reduction in the GPG might have.  
 
The minimum and maximum impact scenarios set out in table 13 show that a decrease of 
the GPG of 2 percentage points will result in an increase in total GDP of US$ 43,902,370,000, 
which in turn will result in a GDP per capita increase of US$ 87.49 across the EU.  
 
Although this provides a more tangible indication of the economic impact of a reduction 
of the gender pay, in order to improve these estimates, further research on the actual 
effect of different policy options on closing the GPG will be needed to further specify 
which policy options are most beneficial in terms of benefits (in addition to further 
elaborating the costs of the implementation of different policies, see for example Matrix, 
2011: pp.66).  Moreover, given the heterogeneous situation across EU Member States in 
terms of the GPG, where countries have already partly implemented some of the policies 
summarised under the Bauer recommendations (see Annex 1 for an overview of different 
initiatives at Member State level), a more differentiated analysis may further add to the 
policy discussion.  
 
6.7.4 The potential economic impact on individual EU Member States 
As described in the introductory section of this chapter, the GPG currently varies 
substantially among European Member States (see Chapter 4). Some countries, such as 
Austria and the Czech Republic, have the widest GPG, exceeding 20 percentage points. 
At the other end of the scale, in Slovenia and Poland, only very modest differences in the 
remuneration between men and women can be found. These disparities mean that some 
countries have scope for greater reductions in the gender wage gap, and have the 
potential to reap part of the economic benefits resulting from a more equalitarian pay 
structure which other countries already enjoy to a certain extent.  
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Table 13: Potential impact of reductions of the GPG on economic output in the EU following the Bauer recommendations 
 
Policy Options 
for closing the 
GPG 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5 
Level of impact Minimum impact 
Maximum 
impact 
Minimum 
impact 
Maximum 
impact 
Minimum 
impact 
Maximum 
impact 
Minimum 
impact 
Maximum 
impact 
Minimum 
impact 
Maximum 
impact 
Decrease in GPG  -2 % -3 -2 -3 0 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 
GDP increase 
(million US$) 43,902.37 65,747.77 43,905.37 65,747.77 - 22,062.96 22,062.96 45,890.25 45,890.25 65,747.77 
GDP p.c. increase 
(US$) 87.49 131.02 87.49 131.02 - 43.97 43.97 87.49 87.49 131.02 
Source: Own calculations, in US$, PPP 2012 for the whole EU  
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Table 14: Estimated increase in GDP per capita across EU Member States 
EU Member States Current level of 
GPG (unadjusted 
GPG, Eurostat) 
GDP p.c. increase 
between 2005-10 
in percent 
Increase in GDP p.c. 
(following 1 
percentage point 
reduction of GPG) 
Increase in GDP 
p.c. (following 5 
percentage point 
reduction of GPG) 
Increase in GDP 
p.c. (following 10 
percentage point 
reduction of GPG) 
Increase in GDP 
p.c. (following 20 
percentage point 
reduction of GPG) 
Austria 23.70 6.70 57.81 289.04 578.09 1,156.18 
Belgium 10.20 5.61 54.44 272.22 544.44 * 
Bulgaria 13.00 19.07 14.81 74.03 148.06 * 
Cyprus 16.40 3.31 32.25 161.24 322.49 * 
Czech Republic 21.00 14.62 33.26 166.29 332.57 665.15 
Denmark 16.40 -1.65 55.92 279.59 559.17 * 
Estonia 27.30 3.97 24.52 122.62 245.24 490.48 
Finland 18.20 3.61 51.22 256.08 512.15 * 
France 14.70 0.13 49.64 248.19 496.38 * 
Germany 22.20 8.01 50.37 251.86 503.73 1,007.45 
Greece - -0.40 41.08 205.39 410.77 821.54 
Hungary 18.00 -0.23 26.74 133.72 267.43 * 
Ireland 13.90 -7.28 59.60 298.02 596.05 * 
Italy 5.80 -3.95 47.54 237.71 * * 
Luxembourg 13.60 3.22 114.62 573.11 1,146.22 * 
Latvia 11.90 -0.84 19.94 99.68 199.35 * 
Lithuania 8.70 6.83 21.44 107.19 * * 
Malta 12.90 8.68 33.37 166.85 333.69 * 
Netherlands 17.90 5.32 58.38 291.91 583.82 * 
Poland 4.50 26.20 21.72 * * * 
Portugal 12.50 1.15 32.50 162.50 324.99 * 
Romania 12.10 14.93 12.77 63.86 127.71  
Slovak Republic 20.50 24.73 25.27 126.35 252.70 505.39 
Slovenia 2.30 9.64 37.47 * * * 
Spain 16.20 -2.03 45.14 225.68 451.36 * 
Sweden 15.80 7.51 56.17 280.84 561.69 * 
United Kingdom 20.10 -0.14 55.38 276.92 553.84 1,107.68 
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In order to see how reductions of different size in the GPG would translate in economic 
benefits of diverse magnitude, Table 15 presents estimated increases in real GDP per 
capita in each of the EU Member States under four possible scenarios. The departure 
point to obtain these estimates is the total growth rate or percent change in real GDP per 
capital that each Member State experimented in the period 2005-2010. What would have 
happened if the GPG had been reduced by 1 percentage point during this period? The 
econometric analysis presented above suggests that this would have led to a total growth 
rate 0.14 percentage points higher over the entire period 2005-2010. The difference 
between the level of real GDP per capita that would have been obtained as a result of 
faster growth and the actual level of real GDP per capita provides an estimation of the 
economic gains produced by a more balanced pay structure. Other possible scenarios 
show what would be the economic gains if the GPG were reduced by 5, 10 and 20 
percentage points over this period. A reduction of 5 percentage points in the pay gap 
over the period 2005-2010, for instance, would have led to a total growth rate 0.7 
percentage points larger (0.14 times 5). Countries whose current GPGs are still over 10 or 
20 could have experimented growth rates 1.4 and 2.8 percentage points larger over the 
2005-2010 period, had they reduced these gaps in 10 and 20 points, respectively. The size 
of the economic gain, therefore, depends on the initial level of GDP per capita, the actual 
rate of growth over the period and the size of the reduction in the gender wage gap. 
 
6.8 Concluding Comments on the Economic Assessment 
This section has shown that there is a clear positive effect of closing the GPG on economic 
growth: a reduction of the gender wage gap of one percentage point might lead to an 
increase in economic growth of 0.14 of a percentage point, compared to a scenario in 
which the GPG remains stable, which in turn would increase total output as well as per 
capita output across the European Union.  
 
As shown in Table 15 above, this 0.14 increase in economic growth could potentially 
increase per capita GDP, depending on how far the GPG is narrowed. As for example 
shown by the example of Austria, a reduction of 10 percentage points in the GPG would 
increase per capita GDP by US$ 578.09. A further reduction of 10 percentage points on a 
current GPG of around 23 %, would result in a total GDP p.c. increase of US$ 1,156.18. As 
this table shows, a reduction beyond the above suggested 2-3 % impact resulting from the 
implementation of policy options such as sanctions or increased transparency in wage 
formation, a substantial reduction of the GPG will have a clear positive impact on 
economic output in the EU.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
This Study has used the Bauer Report as a basis to consider the question as to the current 
scale, nature and dynamics of the GPG across the EU and to assess the consequential 
economic impact. Focussing on five of the nine recommendations set out in the Bauer 
Report, the Study has gone on to consider the potential impact of a EU wide legislative 
package of measures on the GPG. 
 
The above sections provide a snapshot of the potential impacts associated with the 
recommendations in the Bauer Report. Given the nature and scope of this Study, the 
research is largely limited to a subset of measures presented in the report and covers only 
a selection of impacts. In addition, the secondary data used in the Study has its 
limitations, in particular due to the lack of “counterfactual” cases, which could help 
isolate the magnitude of the impact generated.  
 
The Study helps to inform the current discussion concerning the potential added value of 
the measures in the Bauer Report. The research design and the causal relationships 
identified can be used to develop a more detailed methodology and a larger research 
programme including primary research to support secondary data collection.  
 
Potential aspects of the recommendations in the Draft Report which could not be 
analysed as part of this Study, but which could add valuable insights include: 
 
 Distribution of impacts across Member States, industry sectors, and employer 
groups; 
 Interaction between national and EU framework; 
 Detailed modelling of impact with expected company compliance levels; 
 Comprehensive costing of the individual recommendations, including costs to 
public authorities; and 
 Isolation of impact and comparison against counterfactual. 
 
Given the limited insight into the impacts of measures proposed in the Bauer Report in 
existing literature, such analysis is likely to enhance the state of knowledge in the field 
and to support EU policy-making in the area. This report constitutes the first step in this 
process.  
 
The Study has also been able to identify a number of research areas that would warrant 
further attention. Whilst it is apparent that there is a significant amount of research being 
undertaken on initiatives that are seeking to reduce the GPG there is still insufficient 
quantification of impact. Understanding the links between the GPG and economic 
growth is also an area which warrants further attention.  
 
This not withstanding the Study has confirmed that the GPG is an issue that warrants 
attention at a European level. The five of the nine recommendations within the Bauer 
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Report that were considered for this Study each have the potential to positively impact 
on reducing the GPG. The impact each one percent reduction in the GPG has on 
economic growth is a further motivation to focus collective efforts. Given that the Study 
also found significant variations across Member States in terms of the manner and extent 
to which they are addressing the issue of the GPG it would see evident that European 
legislation can continue to help focus efforts on initiatives which may have the greatest 
impact on reducing the GPG and to do so in a manner which will bring a degree of 
uniformity across the EU. 
 
Recognising that there are a number of ways to measure the GPG, the European 
Parliament could consider the role it can play in improving the consistency and reporting 
of data so as to have an improved sense of where progress is being made as where it is 
not being made as well as the drivers for change. In this way European Institutions can 
focus on providing European added value by providing a legislative base, improved 
monitoring and reporting and clear policy goals and in doing so support Member States 
to make significant improvements in reducing the GPG and in doing so facilitate 
economic growth. 
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Table 1: Individual country assessment Austria  
Whole economy10 23.7% (provisional) 
Public sector 11 19.6% (2010 data) Gender pay gap 
Private sector  24.6% (2010 data) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The National Action Plan – ‘Gender Equality in the Labour 
Market’, by Minister of Women and Civil Service (2008–2013) 
aimed to reduce gender differences in employment. There 
was social partner agreement in May 2010 on 16 measures 
including an online pay calculator; guidelines for works 
councils and HR professionals for the analysis of pay gaps 
and job evaluation; and pay transparency in job 
announcements and income transparency reports. 
■ From 2010 onwards, employers have been legally required to 
produce income reports according to company size12. These 
reports must contain the number of men and women 
employed including the collective agreement category 
attached to it, the company assignment category, the average 
median income and adjusted working time for men and 
women (BKA, 2010:.67). Income transparency reports are 
anonymous and conducted every two years. They show 
average/median pay by occupational category by gender and 
are available to the works council/employees (EF, 2012b). 
■ In October 2011, the unions in the metal, mining, gas and 
heating sectors, GPA-djp und PRO-GE, concluded a major 
new collective agreement for about 165,000 workers. This 
included a minimum guaranteed increase of EUR 80 a month 
for the lowest paid and an extension of parental leave time 
from 10 months to 16 months –seen as important to narrow 
the GPG as female workers get fewer promotions because of 
time away from employment, through maternity or parental 
leave (ITUC, 2012). The GPA-DJP stated in 2011 that special 
negotiations could occur three times over a 10-year period, 
where employers and trade unions discuss sectoral pay 
figures and develop measures to reduce pay inequality 
between men and women (ITUC, 2012).   
■ The Minister of Women and Civil Service established an 
online Salary Calculator to compare average salaries for 
women and men13 (EC, 2011). This calculator was set up to 
provide easily accessible and current information on pay 
schemes in particular occupations/sectors (BAK, 2010).  
■ Employers who do not fulfil the requirement to produce the 
required data can be publically named on the website of the 
Federal Ministry for Women’s Affairs. However, “this 
sanction is reportedly not very deterrent” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom. 3) 
■ Job classification systems (plant level and in sector collective 
agreements) must take into account the principle of equal pay 
for equal and equivalent work (Foubert et al, 2010). 
■ The high GPG is attributed to gender specific labour market 
y 
                                            
segregation. Research has been undertaken; put on agenda b10 Data on GPG in EU Member States sourced from Eurostat (unadjusted GPG, 2011, nless stated)  
11 Data on public and private GPG sourced from Eurostat (unadjusted GPB by economic control, 5, 
2011, unless stated)  
12 Companies with more than 1000 employees from 2011 for the year 2010, more than 500 from 2012 
for 2011, more than 250 from 2013 for 2012, more than 150 from 2014 for 2013).  
13 Link to tool:  http://www.gehaltsrechner.gv.at/ 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-68
European Added Value of applying the principle of equal pay 
 
Trade Unions and as a result a guideline for the application 
of non-discriminatory analytical work evaluation was 
developed in 2004 (EC, 2006).  
■ Nationwide collective agreement signed in social and health 
services (where the vast majority of employees are women) in 
2003 covering 35,000 employees in the private sector. This 
agreement established a pay scheme for nine different pay 
levels according to skills and experience and replaced more 
than 200 different pay schemes in individual company 
regulations (EC, 2006). 
■ A manual on the analysis of income differences and job 
evaluation was prepared for works councils, HR specialists 
and employees in 2011 by the Austrian Minister of Women 
and Civil Service involving the social partners as cooperation 
partners. 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ All public sector authorities at federal level are obliged to 
take action to eliminate gender inequality (EIRO, 2004). 
Labour Constitution Act obliges employers to consult with 
work councils on positive action for women at company level 
(Eurofound, 2002). 
■ If the Equal Treatment Commission suspects discriminatory 
practices, it can oblige the employer to submit a report of male 
and female comparisons regarding “conditions of work”. If a 
violation is detected, the Commission can request this report 
“for one for more subsequent years” (Foubert et al, 2010). 
■ “The Equality Bodies (Ombudsperson or Equality Affairs) 
have always played an important role, not only by 
counselling and supporting individuals, but also by 
conducting surveys and studies, by inventing and installing 
instruments as well as by information supply and capacity 
building of all stakeholders” (ibid.) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ Since 2011 there has been a company obligation to indicate 
the minimum wage and, where appropriate, the possibility of 
over payment in job announcements in their income report. 
Violating these regulations results in a first warning fine of 
up to EUR 360 (EC, 2012a). 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Alongside labour market segregation, the high GPG is 
attributed to the high proportion of part-time work 
performed by women (EIRO, 2009).14 The EC (2012) states: 
‘Steps have been taken to improve the situation of women in 
the labour market by extending care services as well as by 
introducing measures to raise awareness of the substantial 
GPG in Austria. However, the measures are not 
commensurate with the existing challenges.’ (2012:26) 
■ From August 2007 a legal claim to premium rates of pay of an 
additional 25% for overtime work was introduced for part-
time workers; aimed to improve the incomes of women 
engaged in part-time work (EF, 2010a).  
 
                                            
14 However, as noted in the National Action Plan on the equal treatment of women and men in the 
labour market in Austria highlights, also when only analysing wage differentials among persons 
working full time year-round, there is still a GPG of 22 percent (BKA, 2010).  
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Table 2: Individual country assessment Belgium 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-70
Whole economy  10.2% 
Public sector  -2.9% GPG 
Private sector  13.8% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Companies are obliged to produce an annual report on 
gender equality, which must be presented to the works 
council or trade union representatives (EIRO, 2004). 
■ Every two years organisations with over 50 workers must 
conduct a comparative analysis of the wage structure of 
female and male employees. If this analysis shows that 
women earn less than men the organisation is obliged to 
produce an action plan (EC, 2013). 
■ Since 2001, a set of indicators have been used to evaluate 
gender pay differences in the country’s annual report on the 
GPG. These indicators have been regularly adapted  (EC, 
2010). Since 2007 the Belgian government has published yearly 
the report “The gender wage gap in Belgium” (EC, 2013) 
■ In the context of the Europe 2020 strategy, Belgium has 
identified an objective of reducing the GPG from 9 % in 2009 
to 5 % in 2020 (see NRP 2011). 
■ In April 2012 a law was passed on reducing the GPG, stating 
that differences in pay and labour costs between men and 
women should be outlined in companies’ annual audit 
(“bilan social”) (EC, 2013) 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Federal government has encouraged modernisation of job 
classifications; legislation allows government to formulate 
conditions that JE systems must fulfil (organisations which 
use job classification systems must ensure they are gender 
neutral)  (Foubert et al, 2010). There was a national 
agreement in 2010 to ensure that by 2016 all job 
classifications are gender neutral in order to reduce the GPG 
(EC, 2011c; EC, 2010).  
■ Through inter-industry agreements the social partners are 
encouraged to adopt a “gender neutral approach to job 
classification” (EC, 2013)  
■ A guidebook on job classification is available for employers 
and trade unions to avoid and eliminate gender bias in pay 
systems (2006; EC, 2007):  
■ Sector joint committees have been ensuring that wage and 
analytical job classifications in collective agreements are free 
from gender bias (EF, 2010a; EF, 2008a) through the EVA 
((Evaluation Analytique/analytische EVAluatie)) project 
(Foubert et al, 2010).  This project has three key objectives: 
revision of training programmes, organisation of new 
training courses and “sensitisation of the social partners; 
analysis of the gender effect of the development and the 
introduction of analytical methods on wages; and the design 
of a universal analytical gender-neutral job classification 
method to analyse all job types” (EC, 2006:49).  
■ Legislation obliges emplo ers to assess and  where 
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■ Article 37 of the Gender Act however allows the Federal 
Government to take steps to guarantee that job classifications 
comply with the principle of gender equality (Foubert et al, 
2010) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ In 2006 Federal government implemented an annual report 
for companies, monitoring progress in reducing the GPG 
(EC, 2007; EIRO, 2004).  
■ The Institute for the Equality of Women and Men was 
established to change job classification through the EVA 
project, with the aim of reducing pay differences between 
women and men (EF, 2010a) and the Institute produced an 
equal pay report which brought transparency to official data 
(EHRC, 2010).  
■ The Institute for Equality between Women and Men is 
entitled to initiate judicial proceedings in the case of 
unsuccessful negotiations (Milieu, 2011).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ The Labour Inspectorate can apply sanctions to organisations 
that violate the compulsory requirements of the Collective 
Agreements Act (1968); however Foubert et al, state there is no 
known occurrence of such intervention (Foubert et al, 2010)  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers exists 
and provides the terms for payment of overtime.  
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Table 3: Individual country assessment Bulgaria 
Whole economy  13.0% 
Public sector  19.9% GPG 
Private sector  11.1% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Awareness raising campaign to reduce the GPG was 
launched by the Government in 2008 (EC, 2011c).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Commission on Protection against Discrimination is entitled 
to initiate judicial proceedings and bring claims before the 
court (Milieu, 2011).  The Commission can establish 
infringements of anti-discrimination law; it can set out 
measures for the prevention of such infringements, and can 
impose  penalties and “apply measures of administrative 
coercion” (Foubert et al,2010)  
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ Commission on Protection against Discrimination can impose 
penalties for infringements of anti-discrimination law 
(Foubert et al, 2010) 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ The Government introduced a measure supporting part-time 
employment for up to three months by paying those moving 
to part-time employment 120 BGN (EUR 60) in addition to 
their lowered wages. The aim of this measure was to protect 
income levels of people moving to part-time employment 
caused by the recession (Smith, 2009).  
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers also 
exists and states the terms for overtime pay, however 
Foubert, 2011 states that remuneration for overtime work is 
very low.  
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Table 4: Individual country assessment Cyprus 
Whole economy  16.4% (Provisional) 
Public sector  0.3% (Provisional)  GPG 
Private sector  25.0% (Provisional) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ In 2008, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance put 
forward measures aimed at reducing the GPG, including 
voluntary equality schemes for organisations (focused on 
larger organisations) and increased awareness of the 
inspection system (EIRO, 2009).  
■ Foubert et al state that Article 6(2) of Law No. 177(I)/2002 
provides that trade unions will inform employees to ensure 
the application of equal pay through written announcements 
posted on boards in the workplace  (Foubert et al, 2010). 
Foubert et al state that Article 6(A)(2) encourages employers to 
promote equal treatment for men and women in a systematic 
way in the workplace and provide employees (and their 
representatives, upon request) at appropriate intervals, with 
information on equal pay for men and women in the 
organisation. This information can “include an overview of the 
proportions of men and women at different levels of the 
organisation, their pay and pay differentials and possible 
measures to improve the situation in cooperation with 
employees’ representatives” (ibid.) 
■ Awareness raising campaigns, publication of guidelines and 
codes of practice have also been documented; with some of 
these measures co-funded by ESF (EP, 2012) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Trade Unions and Employers’ Organizations have been 
reported to arrange seminars for training their officers on job 
evaluation schemes and conduct gender equality surveys 
(Foubert, 2010:68).  
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ In the 2008 proposals by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Insurance measures including a programme of theoretical and 
practical training for officials responsible for monitoring and 
implementing the legislation on workplace gender equality 
and the establishment of a new monitoring body: ‘Working 
Environment Gender Equality Certification Body for 
Enterprises’ responsible for the monitoring of practices 
implemented to tackle gender discrimination (EIRO, 2009) 
were put forward.  
■ The Equality and Equal Treatment Department of the 
Democratic Labour Federation of Cyprus have also provided 
their officers with guidance  on equal pay, training and 
seminars to raise awareness of the GPG and to promote gender 
equality in wage setting (EF, 2010a). 
■ The Authority Against Discrimination also has responsibility 
for investigating cases of pay discrimination (EC, 2006).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Article 6(1) of Law No. 76(I)/2002 provides that a part-time 
employee shall not be treated less favourably than a 
comparable full-time employee unless different treatment is 
justified on objective grounds.  It also states that  every part-
time employee is “entitled to equal terms and conditions of 
employment and to equal treatment and shall be afforded the 
same protection as that given to a comparable full-time 
employee, in particular with regard to salary and benefits” 
(Foubert et al, 2010)  
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■ A number of interventions, designed and financially 
supported by the ESF15, were implemented, including an 
ERDF co-financed programme aimed at enhancing 
entrepreneurship among women. A target was also set to 
reduce the GPG by 5 percentage points by 2015 (EC 2006: 12) 
■ Soumeli (2009) stated that ‘In April 2009, a number of 
amendments were made to the existing legislation on equal 
pay for men and women for equal work or work of equal 
value….in particular the amendment aims to harmonise 
national legislation with the European directive on equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
employment, and also to comply with the revised European 
Social Charter’ (Soumeli, 2009). 
 
 
                                            
15 ‘The above activities are laid down in the National Action Plan for reducing GPG covering the 
period 2010-2015 with a budget of EUR 3,5 million (co-financed by the ESF). The set target is to 
reduce by 2015 the GPG by 5 pp, down to 18% from 23% where it stood in 2009.’ (Ibid.) 
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Table 5: Individual country assessment Czech Republic  
Whole economy  21.0% 
Public sector  19.5% GPG 
Private sector  22.8% 
 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Foubert et al identified that there “are no strategies to require 
the release of information about pay broken down by gender. 
Information on pay is regarded as private information and is 
not normally released by employers; employees may even be 
obliged by some labour contracts not to inform other 
employees about their salary” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
■ The social partners however try to encourage individual 
companies to use different approaches such as screening of job 
descriptions to check that they do not contain discriminatory 
elements, reviewing of pay criteria to check that they are not 
discriminatory, equality plans, modernisation of pay systems 
(ETUC, 2009). The Confederation of Industry also distributed a 
guide for employers called ―How to tackle the pay gap in July 
2007 (ETUC, 2009).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ There is a specific body dealing with gender equality in 
employment : the Government Council for the Equal 
Opportunities of Women and Men (EF, 2010a) and employers 
are by labour inspectorates, “according to Act No. 251/2005 
Coll., on labour inspection” (Foubert, 2010) 
■ The Committee for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 
of the Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(čMKOS) also promotes equal pay for equal work (EC, 2006).  
■ The Action Plan for 201016 contains 37 items including the 
balanced participation of men and women in the labour market 
and the GPG. No.17 requires the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs to monitor compliance with employment law. This 
includes compliance with: the provisions prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of gender; the principles of 
equal pay for work of equal value; and opportunities for 
promotion at work. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
can then conduct “a statistical analysis of the inspections on 
compliance” (EC, 2010). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
 
 
 
                                            
16 ‘At present, there is no specific action plan to close the GPG in the Czech Republic. However, 
measures were included in a general government action plan for gender equality. Since 1998, the 
action plan has been updated periodically each year. In action plans, the Czech government 
instructs ministries and other central administrative bodies to carry out specific measures in order 
to promote gender equality. Some tasks are for general adoption by all ministries.’ (Ibid.) 
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Table 6: Individual country assessment Denmark  
Whole economy  16.4% 
Public sector  13.5% GPG 
Private sector  18.2% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The ‘Act on gender specific pay statistics’, states that companies 
with more than 35 employees and groups with a minimum of 
10 women and 10 men that hold the same job are obliged to 
report on wage statistics broken down by gender to the 
Statistical Bureau(EF, 2010a; Foubert et al, 2010). If the employer 
requests it, the Statistical Bureau will process the data and 
deliver gender-specific statistics for the individual employer’s 
business” (Foubert et al, 2010:78)  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ There is no mandatory job evaluation.  
■ Ministry of Labour published analysis in 2001 stating job 
evaluation may be route to narrowing GPG. Guidance on the 
use of job evaluation has been published as a tool to promote 
equal pay in the municipal sector (EC, 2006). 
■ A campaign ‘Charter for more women in management’ was 
undertaken by the Minister for Gender Equality in 2008 and 
was targeted at combating vertical segregation. The charter 
includes guidelines, which companies are expected to comply 
with (EF, 2010a). 
Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Board of Equal Treatment is entitled to initiate judicial 
proceedings. It can bring a case before the judiciary if other 
non-judicial proceedings have failed (Milieu, 2011).  
■ The Equality Complaints Board is permitted to deal with 
complaints about discrimination on grounds of sex including 
equal pay claims. This body cannot however conduct 
independent surveys concerning discrimination, or make 
recommendations on any issue relating to such discrimination 
and it cannot start cases at its own initiative. “It is therefore not 
a monitoring body” (Foubert, 2010). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 7: Individual country assessment Estonia 
Whole economy  27% 
Public sector  Unavailable GPG 
Private sector  Unavailable 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ An Action plan to reduce the GPG was approved in 2012, which 
included improving the implementation of the existing Gender 
Equality Act (improvement of the collection of statistics, 
awareness raising) and analysing organisational practices and 
pay systems in the public sector (EC, 2013).  
■ There was also a target for reducing the pay gap (EC, 2007) in 
the action plan of the Ministry of Social Affairs 2007–10. The 
target aimed to reduce the GPG from 24% to 20% by 2010 (EC, 
2006).The Ministry of Social Affairs also started a project to 
analyse the GPG and its causes (Foubert et al, 2010). EIRO (2009) 
however stated that few initiatives had been taken to address to 
gap.  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ In 2008, the Promotion of Gender Equality programme was 
launched by the Gender Equality Department at the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (EF, 2010a).  
■ Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions provided their officers 
with guidance on equal pay, training and seminars to raise 
awareness on the GPG and to promote gender equality in wage 
setting (EF, 2010a). 
■ Foubert et al (2010) stated that the Commissioner for Gender 
Equality and Equal Treatment has “a relatively extensive 
competence under the law to make policy recommendations”. 
According to Article 16 of the Equal Treatment Act (ETA), the 
Commissioner can monitor compliance with the requirements of 
the gender equality act (Foubert et al, 2010)  
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 8: Individual country assessment Finland  
Whole economy  18.2% (Provisional) 
Public sector  20.9% GPG 
Private sector  18.3% 
 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Has country target for reducing the pay gap (EC, 2007, EC, 
2013). 17 
■ The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health established a working 
group in 2004 for equal pay. The main aim of the programme 
was to reduce the GPG by 5 percentage points until the year 
2015 (EC, 2006). Also addresses the GPG by directing funds to 
female-dominated/and or low paid sectors through central level 
negotiations (EF, 2008b). 
■ Employers are required to carry out a specific pay survey and 
investigate reasons for gender pay differences as part of the 
gender equality planning required under the Act on Gender 
Equality between women and men (2005) (Warth, 2009; EIRO, 
2004).  
■ Employers with 30 or more employees have a duty to promote 
equality in terms of pay and other terms of employment. An 
equality plan is drawn up every year, although by local 
agreement, the plan interval can be extended to up to three years 
(Foubert et al, 2010). The plan is written in cooperation with 
employee representatives and it must include an analysis of the 
placement of women and men in different jobs, and an analysis 
of the job classification, and pay differentials of women’s and 
men’s jobs.” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
■ One of nine goals of the Equal Pay Programme set up by the 
Finish government (from 2006-2011) was to develop pay 
statistics which are sector- and gender-specific by 2010. Another 
objective was to conduct more pay surveys(EC, 2010).   
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ The social partners created a job evaluation system for 
implementation at organisational level (EF, 2002).  
■ The Government’s 2008–2011 Action Plan included an objective 
to reduce the GPG – in particular, through initiatives aimed at 
tackling occupational segregation (EF, 2010a).  
■ Trade union policy measures focus on analytical job evaluation 
schemes (EC, 2006). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Responsibility for monitoring whether companies comply with 
the Gender Equality Act lies with the Office of the Ombudsman 
for Equality (EIRO, 2004). The Office of the Ombudsman for 
Equality published a gender equality 'toolkit' providing 
guidelines on how to draw up the legally sanctioned gender 
equality plans (Ibid.). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ The Equality Ombudsman may set a deadline for an employer to 
implement a pay mapping exercise. The Equality Board may, at 
the request of the Equality Ombudsman, impose a conditional 
fine on the employer. Foubert et al (2010) state that the resources 
of the Equality Ombudsman to monitor this duty are however 
limited.  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
 
 
                                            
17 The government’s Equal Pay Programme seeks to reduce the GPG to 15% by 2015 and to 
implement the principle of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ 
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Table 9: Individual country assessment France 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-79
Whole economy  14.7% (Provisional) 
Public sector  13.2% (2010 data) GPG 
Private sector  16.4% (2010 data) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Law from 2001 made it compulsory for companies and sectors to 
negotiate equality and to introduce equality in all bargaining 
areas, including pay (EC, 2006) and the 2006 Act on Equal Pay 
between Women and Men requires companies to report on 
salaries and plans to close the GPG (EC, 2013) 
■ Employers with at least 50 employees are required by the 
Labour Code to produce a comparative annual report of the 
employment position of men and women including the actual 
pay for each occupational category, for the work council (EF, 
2002). There is mandatory publication of these indicators at the 
workplace by the employer (Foubert, 2010). Employers must 
legally negotiate at company and sector level on the objectives of 
occupational gender equality (EF, 2002; Foubert, 2010). 
■ Companies with fewer than 300 employees can also receive 
financial assistance from the State in order to conduct a Study of 
their employment equality position and the measures which 
would help  to re-establish equal opportunities for  men and 
women (Article R 1143-1 of the Labour Code). The financial 
incentives can account for up to 70% of the costs of the audit. 
(Foubert et al, 2010)._ 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ The HALDE (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et 
pour l'Egalité, French national anti-discrimination authority, 
which has been integrated into the Défenseur des Droits) 
emphasised building technical knowledge of the GPG and built 
expertise amongst researchers, social partners, lawyers, 
institutions, and training was delivered by “evaluation of 
experience specialists and task evaluation specialists” (EHRC, 
2012:6). 
■ Contracts for greater gender balance in employment allow 
women to individually take on traditional male jobs in their 
company. Tripartite contracts are signed by the state, the 
employer and the female employee. Firms with fewer than 600 
staff are eligible. The state may meet up to 50% of training costs 
and of the costs of changing facilities; and may pay 30% of pay 
costs during relevant training (EIRO, 2004). 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The HALDE (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et 
pour l'Egalité, French national anti-discrimination authority, 
which has been integrated into the Défenseur des Droits) is 
entitled to initiate judicial proceedings.  
■ Pension reform law included a penalty of up to 1% of the payroll 
costs for companies with at least 50 employees, and which had 
not met their obligations to reduce the pay gap by 1 January 
2012 (EF, 2012).  
■ Law on pay equality between men and women (March 2006) 
strengthened women's rights in respect of maternity leave; and 
provided an obligation for organisations to take steps to close 
the GPG by 31 December 2010 (EC, 2007) 
■ National intersectoral agreements on gender equality and 
gender balance in workforce composition were also concluded 
in France in April 2004 and covered issues such as narrowing the 
GPG; preventing maternity leave from adversely affecting 
women’s career progression and addressing labour market 
Research paper on economic aspects 
 
 
segregation (EF, 2008b). 
■ Génisson Law 2001 is an obligation for the social partners to 
have compulsory negotiations on occupational gender equality 
(including equal pay)  (Foubert, 2011) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ French companies that have not taken steps to close the pay gap 
between women and men, through a collective agreement or 
unilateral action plan, may be fined up to 1% of their payroll 
costs from 1 January 2012 (EF, 2012). 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 10: Individual country assessment Germany 
Whole economy  22.2%18 
Public sector  13.9% [Provisional data] GPG 
Private sector  25.8% [Provisional data] 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The federal government is pursuing measures to address the 
causes of the GPG. These measures include analysis and 
transparency tools such as the ‘Logib-D programme, through 
which companies can voluntarily analyse their wage systems 
and detect a GPG’(EC, 2010).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ The unions have been campaigning for upgrading of “typically 
female jobs” since early 1990s; “gender fair” job evaluation in 
the public sector and the IG Metall metalworkers union 
demanded reassessment of female dominated jobs (EF, 2002). 
The German trade union Ver.di led a campaign to re-evaluate 
the pay of women working in the social and childcare sectors 
(EC, 2011c).  
■ In 2010 social partners reached an agreement to continue 
negotiations on a transparent wage group system to replace the 
traditional – sex discriminatory – collective agreement for white-
collar workers within the public services 
(Bundesangestelltentarifvertrag, BAT) (Foubert et al, 2010).  
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Efforts to introduce legal remedies and mandatory obligations 
have been opposed by employers’ organisations in the past. 
There was a preference among the social partners to develop 
voluntary models (EF, 2002).  
■ The 2001 Federal Equality Act for the Public Sector provided for 
the establishment of workplace-specific equality plans (EIRO, 
2004).  
■ German United Services Union have provided their officers 
with guidance on equal pay, training and seminars to raise 
awareness on the GPG and to promote gender equality in wage 
setting (EF, 2010a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Policy on part-time working hours includes gender specific 
considerations.  
■ The Part-Time Work Act (Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz) serves 
to protect part-time workers and protect against indirect 
discrimination of women. “It is applicable to both individual 
contracts and collective agreements, and it stipulates that part-
time work has to be remunerated” on a pro-rata basis (Foubert 
et al, 2010) . 
 
                                            
18 Data form Germany shows that the GPG is significantly lower in its new Bundeslaender. For data 
on East and West Germany see 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/VerdiensteArbeitskosten/
VerdienstunterschiedeMaennerFrauen/Tabellen/Verdienstabstand.html 
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Table 11: Individual country assessment Greece 
Whole economy  Unavailable 
Public sector  Unavailable GPG 
Private sector  Unavailable 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Guidance exists on the integration of gender equality in 
organisations, including equal pay for work of equal value, with 
recommendations for public administration and social partners 
(EC, 2007; EC, 2006). 
■ The General Secretariat of Gender Equality (GSGE) introduced 
incentives for employers to promote gender equality; however, 
Foubert et al, state that these do not specifically address the GPG 
(Foubert, 2010).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ A National Commission for Gender Equality was 
established.This composed of representatives of ministries, local 
authorities, the Economic and Social Committee, social partners’ 
federations, three NGOs and two experts, and was chaired by the 
Minister of the Interior, according to Foubert et al (2010). The 
purpose of this body was “to implement the requirements of 
Directive 2002/73 for social dialogue; propose gender equality 
policies and measures and assess their implementation” (Foubert, 
2010).  The equality body can open investigations, but cannot 
start judicial proceedings (Foubert et al, 2010). The Ombudsman 
cannot lodge judicial proceedings or impose sanctions (ibid.)and  
it mainly deals with complaints through mediation (Foubert et al, 
2010). 
■ By law there is a gender based employment quota in the public 
sector and positive action for promoting gender equality is 
allowed 
4. Sanctions (recom.8  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 12: Individual country assessment Hungary  
Whole economy  18.0% 
Public sector  20.5% GPG 
Private sector  15.3% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ An Equal Opportunity Plan (EOP) is mandatory for public 
employers (and for employers with a majority state share), 
provided that they have more than 50 employees (EC, 2007; 
EIRO, 2004; Foubert et al, 2010). The content of the EOP and its 
implementation depends on the employer and Foubert et al 
(2010) states that it often does not address the pay gap (Foubert et 
al, 2010)  
■ Under the National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions, 
an interactive database for GPGs, and a monitoring mechanism 
was established (EC, 2006). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ A specific body dealing with gender equality in employment has 
been established (Equal Treatment Authority) (EF, 2010a) and it is 
entitled to initiate judicial proceedings (Milieu, 2011). 
■  The equality body can proceed only where there has been 
violation of equal treatment provisions and normally it only acts 
upon a claim. If violation of equal pay is detected, the equality 
body can impose a fine.  
■  An  additional sanction is the publication of the final decision on 
the equality body’s website. This means that the employer would 
be excluded from “the qualification of having ‘orderly labour 
relations’, a precondition of applying for public money” (Foubert 
et al, 2010:23)  
■ Foubert et al (2010), however state the body has no power to 
promote active measures to close the pay gap 
 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) See above 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 13: Individual country assessment Ireland 
Whole economy  13.9% (2010 data) 
Public sector  12.1% GPG 
Private sector  21.6% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The social partners have helped develop and improve statistical 
monitoring of pay differentials (ETUC, 2009) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The Equality Authority is entitled to initiate judicial proceedings 
(Milieu, 2011). 
■  In 2003, the Equality Authority launched an 'equality review and 
action plan' scheme - a voluntary employer/employee-led 
initiative designed to promote gender equality in the workplace. 
The initiative received EUR 6.3 million in funding over five years 
(EIRO, 2004).  
■ Introduced the National Women’s Strategy 2007–2016, along with 
a programme of positive action measures, including the Equality 
for Women Measure 2008–2013 (EF, 2010a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Under the “Protection of Employment (Part-Time Employees) Act 
2001 there is provision for pro-rata entitlements with full-time 
employees.  
■ The Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Access to 
Part- Time Working) Declaration Order 2006341 states that 
requests by employees to transfer from full-time to part-time 
work and vice versa or to increase working hours should be 
granted.” (Foubert et al, 2010:144) 
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Table 14: Individual country assessment Italy 
Whole economy  5.8% 
Public sector  3.8% GPG 
Private sector  16.7% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ There is an obligation on public and private organisations 
employing more than 100 staff to provide statistical information 
on the employment conditions of their employees broken down by 
gender every two years (1991 Law on Positive Actions; Article 9, 
Act 125/1991). Companies must provide the report to local 
equality advisors and trade unions (EC, 2007; EC, 2006; EF, 2010a). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ According to Article 28 of Law No. 903 of 9 December 1977, job 
classification systems have to adopt the same criteria to determine 
wage levels for men and women (EF, 2010a). 
■ Foubert et al (2010) state that there are  “innovative systems of job 
evaluation for those who are involved in family-care activities, in 
order to avoid their marginalization” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Some sectoral agreements contain provisions such as the 
establishment of joint equality bodies, observatories and working 
groups to monitor employment data and promote analysis aimed 
at designing positive equality action plans (EIRO, 2004).  
■ National body established to promote initiatives such as 
affirmative action, surveys, exchange of information to tackle 
gender based discrimination, although Eurofound state that 
implementation of this was difficult. A decree law supported the 
activities of the National Equal Opportunities Committee 
(Eurofound, 2002). 
■ Equality Advisors are entitled to initiate judicial proceedings 
before Labour Tribunal and Regional Administrative Tribunal 
(Milieu, 2011).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ Under the Code for Equal Opportunities, both the Labour 
Inspectorate and Equality Bodies can issue an order to end 
unlawful practice and in such cases payment of an administrative 
sanction may be requested (Foubert et al, 2010). The fine to be paid 
by employers (EUR 516 to EUR 1 500) is issued in case of 
infringement of anti-discrimination legislation (Foubert et al, 
2010). 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers exists and 
states the conditions for payment of overtime. 
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Table 15: Individual country assessment Latvia 
Whole economy  13.6% 
Public sector  17.5% GPG 
Private sector  13.4% 
 
1.  Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Information on pay in the public sector was to be made accessible 
through amendments to legislation. These amendments were to 
provide an obligation for employers in the public sector to provide 
information on the pay of individuals employed by the public 
sector (Foubert et al, 2010) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Division into ‘male’ and ‘female’ jobs is considered to be a 
‘normal’ occurrence. Female’ jobs are paid less and women agree 
to work for a lower salary, which is considered typical (EF, 2010a). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The Gender Equality Council was established in 2002 to promote 
gender equality policy in public administration institutions and to 
draft recommendations (EF, 2010a).  
■ The Labour Inspectorate and the Ombudsman Office perform the 
tasks of the National Equality Body. “The Labour Inspectorate 
formally has the right to monitor the application of all labour law 
stipulations by employers. However, so far, this institution has not 
taken any action to tackle the pay gap systematically. Similarly, 
the Ombudsman Office has not taken any action to address the 
problem of the pay gap” (Foubert et al, 2010), but the Ombudsman 
is entitled to initiate judicial proceedings (Milieu, 2011).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Policy on part-time work includes gender specific considerations.  
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Table 16: Individual country assessment Lithuania  
Whole economy  11.9% 
Public sector  12.1% GPG 
Private sector  16.0% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ At company level social dialogue between employers and trade 
unions plays an important role and collective agreements help to 
maintain equal pay (ETUC, 2009) ; however Foubert et al state that 
“there are no legal or other instruments that oblige employers to 
address the issue of equal pay. Voluntary instruments are almost 
unknown in Lithuania” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
■ The National Programme on Equal Opportunities for Women and 
Men for 2010-2014 however sets out a priority to reduce the GPG 
including actions to increase salaries in female-dominated sectors 
such as education, arts and culture and social work (EC, 2013) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ An example of addressing gender neutral job classification is the 
‘model collective agreement’ which is used to draw up collective 
agreements. Social partners recommend applying the Methodology 
for the Assessment of Jobs and Positions in order to ensure fair pay. 
This methodology is based on an assessment of a job using eight 
main factors: education, professional experience, levels of positions 
and management, scope of decision making and freedom of action, 
autonomy and creativity at work, responsibility, work complexity, 
and conditions of work (EF, 2010a). 
■ Job (re-)evaluation schemes involve a review of job characteristics 
based on objective criteria, from a gender perspective. This can 
achieve a favourable re-evaluation of typically female occupations 
(EF, 2008b).  
■ Under Section 188(3), Labour Code it is stated that “within the 
work classification system for determining pay, the same criteria 
shall be equally applicable to both men and women, and the 
system must be worked out in such a way as to avoid any 
discrimination on the grounds of sex” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ There is an obligation for social partners to bargain on equal pay 
(under law of June 2004). Collective bargaining has to take into 
account the principle of equal pay between men and women (EC, 
2007).  
■ The Office of the Equal Opportunity Ombudsman was created in 
1999 for gender equality purposes, but most cases investigated are 
not linked to gender equality in employment (Foubert et al, 2010) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ Section 6, p. 1, of the Equal Opportunities Act of Women and Men 
states that violation of equal rights for women and men is 
sanctioned “according to the rules of administrative law”: the 
Administrative Penalties Act 408 imposes administrative fines of 
approximately EUR 35 to EUR 1100 (Foubert et al, 2010) 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 17: Individual country assessment Luxemburg 
Whole economy  8.7% (Provisional) 
Public sector  9.3% (2009 data) GPG 
Private sector  10.9% (2009 data) 
 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The Ministry of Equal Opportunities developed a programme to 
encourage private organisations to focus efforts on achieving 
equality between men and women. Such programmes could 
“include specific provisions on the GPG” (Foubert et al, 2010:169). 
■ The Ministry for Equal Opportunities and the Central Service for 
Statistics and Economic Studies developed software which allows 
employers to check gender pay equality in their organisation. The 
software (LOGIB) was developed by the Swiss Federal Office for 
Equality between women and men. The tool “should enable 
companies to check whether wage differences between female and 
male workers can be explained by objective factors” (Foubert et al, 
2010) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Job evaluation was included in the 2001-5 Action Plan on equal 
opportunities (EF, 2002). 
■ GPG policies focus on more systematic application of job 
evaluation systems (EC, 2006). 
■ The Ministry of Equal Opportunities, with the Chamber of 
Commerce provide training courses on gender-neutral evaluations 
of job classifications for company management (EC, 2006). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Legislation stipulates employers must negotiate equal treatment, 
including the negotiation of an equality plan. All collective 
agreements must provide for the application of the principle of 
equal pay for women and men (UN, 2009). 
■ A specific body dealing with gender equality in employment has 
been established (Inter-ministerial Gender Equality Committee) 
(EF, 2010a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 18: Individual country assessment Malta 
Whole economy  12.9% 
Public sector  -1.3% (2010 data) GPG 
Private sector  11.9% (2010 data) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ The ETE Regulations of 2004 stated that an employer has the duty 
‘to ensure, in particular, that where a job classification system is 
used for determining pay, it shall be based on the same criteria for 
both men and women and so drawn up as to as to exclude any 
discrimination on grounds of sex’” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
■ Gender-neutral job classifications have been indicated as an 
important instrument to fight the GPG (Foubert, 2010)  
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ There is a specific body dealing with gender equality in 
employment (Gender Equality Unit of the Employment and 
Training Corporation) (EF, 2010a).  
■ The National Commission for the Promotion if Equality is entitled 
to initiate judicial proceedings (Milieu, 2011).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 19: Individual country assessment Netherlands 
Whole economy  17.9% 
Public sector  18.1% GPG 
Private sector  18.1% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Trade union policy initiatives focus on providing information, for 
example website tools to check pay levels (EC, 2006). 
■ The ‘Wage indicator’ project attempts to improve information 
about ‘real’ wages for men and women, beyond the ‘formal’ wages 
agreed in collective bargaining agreements (EC, 2006). 
■ The ‘Equal Pay Quick Scan’ software programme allows  
employers pay data to be analysed, to determine whether an 
investigation into the pay system is required (Foubert, 2011).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Job evaluation seen as means to achieve gender equity in the 
Netherlands. In 2001 the social partners developed a check list to 
prevent unequal pay for use when implementing and evaluating 
pay systems (EF, 2002; EF, 2010a). The Equal Pay Checklist, (‘Je 
verdiende loon’; ‘The wage you deserve’) prepared by the national 
representatives of the social partners (Stichting van de Arbeid, 
STAR) with the support of the Ministry of Social Affairs can be 
applied by employers, works councils, union representatives and 
individual employees (Foubert et al, 2010: 188). 
■ The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission conducted a job 
evaluation for 18 hospitals involving over 600 employees (EHRC, 
2010).  
■ Foubert et al (2010) state that “§2 (Articles 7-12) of the ETA gives 
special rules on the definition of pay, on how to compare jobs, on 
job evaluation, on other elements of pay (not just pecuniary) and 
on how to compare jobs/pay in case of part-time work “(Foubert 
et al, 2010:186).  
■ Foubert et al (2010) also reported that a guide on sex-neutral job 
evaluation which provides guidance on how to evaluate whether a 
job evaluation system is free from gender bias was sent to the 12 
owners of the most frequently used job evaluation systems in the 
Netherlands. (ibid.: 188) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ In December 2008, the Labour Inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie) was 
given responsibility for enforcing the obligation on employers to 
scrutinise pay inequalities in their organisation (EF, 2010a).  
■ The National Working Group on Equal Pay brings together 
organisations relevant to equal pay – employees and employers’ 
organisations, the Equal Treatment Commission, the Dutch 
Human Resources Policy Association and the Dutch Association 
for Employee Participation and has responsibility for awareness 
raising and promoting the implementation of equal pay (EC, 2006; 
EC, 2007; EF, 2010a).  
■ The Government stated [in 2008 ] that it had instructed the Labour 
Inspectorate to investigate claims of probable unequal pay given 
by the Trade Unions, the ETC or NGOs and to request employers 
to investigate and to report on these. The Labour Inspectorate can 
force the employer to do more analysis and discuss  results with 
the Workers Council (Ondernemingsraad). “The Labour 
Inspectorate, at this point, has no mandate to sanction the 
employer.” (Foubert et al, 2010: 186) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-90
European Added Value of applying the principle of equal pay 
 
Table 20: Individual country assessment Poland  
Whole economy  4.5% 
Public sector  0.1% GPG 
Private sector  17.2% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Policy exists on decreasing gender wage differentials (EC, 2006). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Legislation “obliges the employer to apply objective and just 
criteria in the evaluation of employees and the results of their 
work” (Foubert et al, 2010:201); however “a general system of 
occupational classifications for the purpose of determining 
remuneration, as well as a universal system for valuing work and 
establishing criteria permitting comparison of various kinds of 
work is still lacking” (Foubert et al, 2010:201). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Awareness raising actions have been taken concerning labour laws 
and workers’ rights. Lawyers, judges, police officers, prosecutors, 
trade union representatives, employer organisations, labour 
inspectors, NGO representatives and government officials have 
been educated and trained (EC, 2006).  
■  The Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment has the 
“role of equality body in the sense of EU equality directives” 
(Foubert, 2010) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
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Table 21: Individual country assessment Portugal  
Whole economy  12.5% 
Public sector  10.8% GPG 
Private sector  23.5% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Law No 35/2004, of 29 July, Articles 452 to 457 and 490) provided 
an obligation for employers to visibly display for at least 30 days, a 
list of their staff indicating each employee's earnings, with the 
exception of central, regional and local administrations, public 
institutes and other collective public bodies, as well as employers 
of domestic service workers (EC, 2007; EC, 2006). This information 
was available to public authorities and to trade unions and 
employers’ associations on demand (EC, 2006). The Labour Code 
(Law No 7/2009, 12 February 2009) removed the obligation to post 
this information in a public place, however employers are still 
required to prepare a data set and submit this to the labour 
inspection authorities.  
■ The 4th Plan for Equality includes among its objectives the 
reduction of the GPG  and introduction of equality plans (EC, 
2013) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ JE practice has been difficult, but is viewed by the trade unions as 
an important tool for creating gender pay equity. (EF, 2002).  
■ The hotel and restaurant sector was the first sector in Portugal to 
develop a job evaluation method free from gender bias. This  
‘Revalue work to promote gender equality’ project was funded by 
the EQUAL Community Initiative and coordinated by the General 
Confederation of the Portuguese Workers, however, a partnership 
comprising employee and employer representatives, state public 
bodies and researchers developed the methodology, which 
compares the value of occupations. The method also enables an 
evaluation of whether the existing GPG results from gender 
prejudice and stereotypes (EWCO, 2009). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Training on gender equality for judges and other partners 
involved in justice administration has been promoted by the 
Commission for Equality in Labour and Employment (EC, 2007; 
EC, 2006). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ Non-compliance of Law No 35/2004, of 29 July, Articles 452 to 457 
may result in a fine of between UC 2 and 15 (each UC corresponds 
to EUR 89) (EC, 2006). 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers exists and 
states the terms for payment of overtime. 
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Table 22: Individual country assessment Romania  
Whole economy  12.1% 
Public sector  22.8% (Estimated data, Eurostat) GPG 
Private sector  2.9% (Estimated data, Eurostat) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The Labour Inspection Office (Inspecţia Muncii) monitors 
measures seeking to ensure equality of opportunity between 
men and women, including equal pay (EF, 2010a). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ There is a specific body dealing with gender equality in 
employment: The National Commission for Equal 
Opportunities between Women and Men (EF, 2010a). 
■ The Labour Inspection Office (Inspecţia Muncii) monitors 
measures seeking to ensure equality of opportunity between 
men and women, including equal pay (EF, 2010a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom 
■ The 2003 Labour Code as well as the provisions of the 2007-2010 
National Collective Bargaining Agreement stated that part-time 
workers should “benefit from the same rights as full-time 
workers and no form of discrimination is allowed based on 
working hours” (Foubert et al, 2010) 
 
 
Table 23: Individual country assessment Slovakia 
Whole economy  20.5% 
Public sector  16.7% GPG 
Private sector  21.0% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The National Labour Inspectorate checked companies for 
compliance with gender equality principles in 2009, regarding 
pay for the equal work and work of equal value. As part of the 
control checks, the labour inspectorate  requested employers to 
address any infringements (EWCO, 2010). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Act No. 311/2001 Coll. on Labour Code defines entitlement to 
pay based on an evaluation of the work performed according to 
its complexity, difficulty and responsibility without any 
discrimination by gender (EF, 2010a).Legislation states that 
“where the employer implements a system of job classification 
for determining pay, it shall be based on the same criteria for 
both men and women without any discrimination on ground of 
sex” (Foubert at al, 2010:220) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ Regional offices of the National Labour Inspectorate carried out 
inspections on equal access to employment and equal pay (EC, 
2011c). 
■ There is a specific body dealing with gender equality in 
employment: The Permanent Committee for Gender Equality 
and Equal Opportunities for the Parliamentary Committee for 
Social Affairs and Housing. Gender equality is negotiated at the 
national tripartite Economic and Social Council (EF, 2010a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers exists 
and states the terms for the payment of overtime. 
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Table 24: Individual country assessment Slovenia 
Whole economy  2.3% 
Public sector  6.4% GPG 
Private sector  9.4% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Public authorities obliged to produce periodical plans and 
biannual reports on the implementation of the National 
Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (2002 
Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men) (EIRO, 2004).  
The National Programme for Equal Opportunities of Women 
and Men (2005–2013) has among its direct objectives the aim of 
reducing the GPG (EF, 2010a). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
The equality body can only help victims of pay discrimination by 
giving legal advice (Foubert et al, 2010) 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ Policy on part-time working includes gender-specific 
considerations.  
 
 
Table 25: Individual country assessment Spain 
Whole economy  16.2% (Provisional) 
Public sector  12.3%  (Provisional) GPG 
Private sector  20.3% (Provisional) 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ GPG policies are mostly linked to awareness-raising measures 
contained in framework agreements by the social partners (EC, 
2006). 
■ The Organic Act 3/2007 for the Effective Equality between 
Women and Men, Corporate Equality Plans (Equinet, 2008) 
included requirements for companies with more than 250 
employees to negotiate equality plans, setting strategies for 
achieving equal treatment and closing the GPG (EC, 2007; EF, 
2008a). 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ JE is viewed as an ‘essential means of fighting pay 
discrimination’ (EF, 2002). However, there has been a lack of 
agreement on what constitutes ‘the value of work’.  
■ Published ‘Guide to good practices in JE’ in 2000 to help detect 
and remedy pay discrimination. (EF, 2002). 
■ Foubert et al (2010) state that “the use of common rules for both 
sexes and neutral criteria to elaborate the different categories 
and groups integrating the classification systems is stated in 
Article 22 of the Workers’ Statute.” (Foubert et al, 2010: 230). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The labour inspectorate implemented a programme,which ran 
until 2010, which  set out equality guidelines. The aim was to 
provide a methodology to enable an external analysis to be 
conducted of issues affecting equal treatment of men and 
women in individual organisations (Foubert et al, 2010:19). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ National legislation on overtime for part-time workers exists 
and states the terms of payment of overtime. 
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Table 26: Individual country assessment Sweden 
Whole economy  15.8% 
Public sector  13.6% GPG 
Private sector  13.7% 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ The 2009 Discrimination Act requires employers with 25 or more 
employees to conduct a pay survey every three years to identify 
and address gender differences in pay, employment terms and 
conditions, and prepare an equal pay action plan (EC, 2011c, EC, 
2013). 
■ The Equal Opportunities Act states that all employers with a 
minimum of ten employees are required to prepare an annual 
equal opportunities plan , which must contain a wage survey of 
pay differences between men and women, indicating the 
measures to be implemented to remedy any inequality (EC, 
2007; EIRO, 2004). Since 2001 it has been explicitly stated by law 
the purpose of the mandatory annual plans to prevent wage 
discrimination and estimate cost of pay adjustments (EF, 2002; 
EC, 2006).  
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Eurofound state that job value discrimination has been brought 
to the Swedish Labour Court on many occasions but there is a 
history of these cases being rejected on basis of “contribution of 
market-based wages”, which are typically higher for men. Some 
change in more recent years (EF, 2002). 
■ “The Equality Ombudsman provides specific tools that may 
assist in establishing gender-neutral job evaluation schemes and 
pay systems. There is the pay evaluation scheme ‘Analys 
Lönelots’ and a more general tool for gender equality analysis of 
pay, ‘Jämställdhetsanalys av löner – steg för steg’”(Foubert et al, 
2010) 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The Equal Opportunities Ombudsman (JämO) is responsible for 
ensuring that employers review the GPG. (EIRO, 2004).  
4. Sanctions (recom.8) 
■ The Equal Opportunities Commission (Jämställdhetsnämnden) 
can impose administrative fines on employers if they do not 
comply with the law by preparing equality plans and reviewing 
gender pay differentials (EIRO, 2004; EC, 2006). 
■ The EOO can also submit requests to the Equal Opportunities 
Board for the application of a penalty on employers who “do not 
observe the rules on ‘active measures’.” (EC, 2006:37). 
Policies 
relating 
to Bauer 
report  
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
 
 
 
PE 504.469   EAVA 4/2013 II-95
Research paper on economic aspects 
 
 
Table 27: Individual country assessment United Kingdom 
Whole economy  20.1% 
Public sector  20.3% GPG 
Private sector  26.0% 
 
1. Improved 
situational analysis 
and transparency of 
results (recom.2) 
■ Employers are prohibited from imposing pay secrecy clauses on 
employees (Foubert et al, 2010) following the Equality Act 2010.   
■ Public sector employers are required to conduct equal pay 
reviews within their organisation (Foubert et al, 2010) 
2. Work evaluation 
and job classification 
(recom.3) 
■ Job evaluation is viewed as means to achieve equal pay for 
work of equal value. Public sector increasingly used job 
evaluation to address historical inequalities (EF, 2002). 
■ Two Agreements: the ‘Single Status’ agreement in local 
government and the ‘Agenda for Change’ in the NHS were 
negotiated with the aim of bringing all employees within equal 
pay and grading structures. These agreements have led to large 
numbers of equal pay claims (EF, 2010a). 
3. Equality bodies and 
legal remedies 
(recom.4) 
■ The Equality and Human Rights Commission and the Equality 
Commission for Northern Ireland are entitled to initiate judicial 
proceedings (Milieu, 2011).  
■ Efforts to introduce legal remedies and mandatory obligations 
have been opposed. There is a preference among the social 
partners to develop voluntary models (EF,2002).  
■ The Equality Act (2006) placed a statutory duty on all public 
authorities to eliminate unlawful discrimination and promote 
equality between men and women (EC, 2007).  
■ In December 2010 the Coalition government announced it 
would not implement the gender pay reporting requirements in 
section 78 of the Equality Act 2010 (compulsory gender pay 
audits in companies with more than 250 employees from 2013) 
and instead would focus on working with organisations with 
150 employees or more to encourage voluntary publication of 
gender pay data (EIRO,2011).  
■ Efforts by the Women and Work Commission resulted in a 
Government Action Plan to increase the availability of quality, 
part-time work; to introduce a public sector gender duty, and to 
ensure career guidance free from gender stereotyping (EF, 
2010a).  
■ The Government Equalities Office (GEO), the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) and 
the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) developed a 
gender equality checklist to  increase employer awareness of the 
implications of their practices (EF, 2010a) 
■ The Trades Union Congress conducted a project in 2003 which 
involved workplace equal-pay representatives being trained to 
address the GPG and conduct equal pay reviews (EF, 2006a). 
4. Sanctions (recom.8)  
 
5. Streamlining of EU 
regulations and EU 
policy (recom.9) 
■ The Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable 
Treatment) Regulations 2000 gave part-time workers “a 
statutory right to be treated no less favourably than their 
comparable full-time colleagues. This meant that part-time 
workers should be paid the same hourly rates as comparable 
full-time workers. Part-time workers are entitled to overtime 
pay at the same rate as full-time workers only once they work 
more than the normal number of hours for a comparable full-
time worker” (Blake Lapthorn, 2009). 
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Annex 2: Data appendix 
 
Table 15: Population and GDP per capita 
 Total population in 1,000s GDP per capita in 2012 EKS$ 
 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Australia 19,053 20,232 21,515 39,533 43,946 47,312 
Austria 8,113 8,185 8,214 38,350 41,316 44,083 
Belgium 10,264 10,364 10,423 36,302 38,910 41,095 
Bulgaria 7,819 7,450 7,149 7,723 10,582 12,600 
Canada 31,100 32,386 33,760 38,571 41,996 42,779 
Chile 15,316 16,128 16,916 10,819 12,815 14,728 
Cyprus 841 924 1,008 21,621 23,048 23,812 
Czech Republic 10,270 10,241 10,202 19,397 23,769 27,245 
Denmark 5,337 5,432 5,516 38,215 39,964 39,303 
Estonia 1,380 1,333 1,291 11,984 17,527 18,223 
Finland 5,169 5,223 5,255 32,487 36,603 37,925 
France 61,163 62,965 64,843 33,726 35,476 35,521 
Germany 82,447 82,704 81,906 35,055 36,001 38,885 
Greece 10,559 10,668 10,750 24,334 29,358 29,241 
Hungary 10,147 10,058 9,992 15,447 19,113 19,070 
Iceland 281 297 309 39,319 45,902 44,401 
Ireland 3,822 4,199 4,623 36,655 42,599 39,498 
Israel 6,115 6,743 7,354 27,037 27,314 31,007 
Italy 57,814 59,068 60,781 33,057 33,977 32,635 
Japan 126,776 127,715 127,579 34,860 36,722 37,377 
Korea 46,839 48,005 48,636 21,602 26,254 31,258 
Luxembourg 439 469 498 73,405 81,920 84,560 
Latvia 2,376 2,290 2,218 9,249 14,248 14,128 
Lithuania 3,654 3,597 3,545 10,364 15,321 16,368 
Malta 390 399 407 22,874 23,849 25,918 
Mexico 99,927 106,203 112,469 13,341 13,780 14,149 
Netherlands 15,915 16,283 16,558 39,982 41,725 43,944 
New Zealand 3,803 4,049 4,253 27,964 31,667 31,898 
Norway 4,492 4,593 4,676 51,783 56,469 57,604 
Poland 38,654 38,558 38,464 13,306 15,526 19,594 
Portugal 10,336 10,566 10,736 22,786 23,227 23,494 
Romania 22,447 22,197 21,959 6,835 9,128 10,491 
Slovak Republic 5,400 5,431 5,470 14,296 18,060 22,526 
Slovenia 2,011 2,011 2,003 22,422 26,778 29,359 
Spain 40,589 43,704 46,506 29,584 32,258 31,605 
Sweden 8,924 9,002 9,074 35,461 40,144 43,160 
Switzerland 7,270 7,441 7,762 43,143 44,980 47,955 
Turkey 67,329 72,674 77,804 9,673 11,196 12,236 
United Kingdom 59,225 60,574 62,438 34,987 39,583 39,527 
United States 282,738 296,119 309,961 45,370 48,752 48,199 
Sources: Conference Board Total Economy Database. 
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Table 16: Savings rates, employment rates and hours worked 
 
Savings as % of GDP 
Employment as 
percent of resident 
population 
Hours worked per 
employed person 
 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Australia 24% 25% 27% 47% 49% 52% 1,795 1,735 1,693 
Austria 26% 27% 26% 46% 47% 50% 1,800 1,764 1,653 
Belgium 26% 26% 23% 40% 41% 43% 1,543 1,563 1,546 
Bulgaria 13% 12% 21% 41% 47% 50% 1,640 1,659 1,653 
Canada 26% 26% 20% 48% 50% 51% 1,788 1,749 1,711 
Chile 23% 30% 30% 35% 39% 45% 2,293 2,189 2,111 
Cyprus 19% 17% 12% 37% 40% 39% 1,926 1,849 1,842 
Czech Republic 28% 29% 28% 47% 48% 50% 1,904 1,827 1,811 
Denmark 27% 26% 22% 52% 51% 51% 1,558 1,556 1,523 
Estonia 25% 27% 27% 41% 45% 43% 1,988 2,010 1,880 
Finland 30% 26% 20% 44% 46% 47% 1,751 1,716 1,677 
France 21% 19% 17% 42% 42% 41% 1,523 1,495 1,478 
Germany 23% 22% 23% 48% 47% 50% 1,471 1,431 1,407 
Greece 11% 12% 8% 40% 44% 44% 2,121 2,095 2,016 
Hungary 24% 22% 25% 42% 42% 41% 2,036 1,992 1,943 
Iceland 16% 16% 23% 56% 54% 54% 1,885 1,794 1,698 
Ireland 37% 39% 31% 44% 47% 40% 1,933 1,883 1,804 
Israel 20% 19% 18% 41% 41% 44% 2,017 1,931 1,929 
Italy 22% 21% 18% 40% 41% 41% 1,861 1,819 1,775 
Japan 27% 24% 21% 51% 50% 49% 1,839 1,815 1,759 
Korea 33% 32% 32% 45% 48% 49% 2,507 2,351 2,193 
Luxembourg 44% 48% 52% 60% 66% 72% 1,662 1,560 1,521 
Latvia 17% 20% 21% 40% 45% 42% 2,209 2,144 1,934 
Lithuania 13% 17% 16% 38% 41% 38% 1,846 1,871 1,882 
Malta 17% 15% 17% 38% 38% 41% 1,960 1,895 1,833 
Mexico 22% 22% 23% 38% 38% 39% 2,167 2,207 2,067 
Netherlands 28% 28% 26% 51% 51% 52% 1,435 1,393 1,381 
New Zealand 23% 22% 21% 48% 52% 51% 1,769 1,751 1,700 
Norway 37% 38% 35% 52% 51% 55% 1,455 1,423 1,415 
Poland 18% 19% 20% 38% 36% 41% 1,919 2,079 2,050 
Portugal 17% 14% 12% 49% 48% 46% 1,969 1,939 1,942 
Romania 14% 12% 20% 48% 42% 41% 1,853 1,853 1,883 
Slovak Republic 23% 24% 22% 37% 38% 40% 1,816 1,770 1,807 
Slovenia 24% 27% 23% 45% 46% 48% 1,710 1,697 1,675 
Spain 23% 24% 21% 40% 44% 41% 1,731 1,686 1,674 
Sweden 25% 26% 25% 48% 48% 50% 1,642 1,605 1,640 
Switzerland 28% 29% 31% 57% 57% 59% 1,674 1,652 1,623 
Turkey 18% 16% 14% 33% 28% 30% 1,960 1,936 1,877 
United Kingdom 16% 14% 13% 46% 48% 47% 1,712 1,676 1,651 
United States 17% 14% 11% 49% 48% 45% 1,740 1,710 1,692 
Sources: World Bank; Conference Board Total Economy Database, own calculations. 
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Table 17: Human capital stock and gender wage gap 
 Share of ISCED4 of the 
total working-age 
population 
Gender wage gap 
(unadjusted) 
 2000* 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010 
Australia    17% 16% 14% 
Austria  24% 27% 23% 22% 19% 
Belgium  29% 33% 14% 12% 7% 
Bulgaria  18% 20%    
Canada    24% 21% 19% 
Chile       
Cyprus  28% 33%    
Czech Republic  13% 16% 22% 19%  
Denmark  28% 27% 15% 12% 12% 
Estonia  33% 35%    
Finland  29% 32% 20% 19% 19% 
France  24% 26% 10% 12%  
Germany  27% 29% 21% 22% 21% 
Greece  26% 30%  17% 12% 
Hungary  16% 19% 14% 4% 6% 
Iceland  26% 33%  13%  
Ireland  34% 43% 20% 14% 11% 
Israel     22% 21% 
Italy  12% 14% 7%  11% 
Japan    34% 33% 29% 
Korea    40% 38% 39% 
Luxembourg  26% 32%    
Latvia  26% 28%    
Lithuania  43% 46%    
Malta   21%    
Mexico       
Netherlands  29% 31% 21% 17%  
New Zealand    7% 10% 7% 
Norway  31% 33% 10% 9% 8% 
Poland  17% 23%  6% 6% 
Portugal  12% 14%  16% 13% 
Romania  13% 16%    
Slovak Republic  11% 15%  20% 15% 
Slovenia  17% 20%    
Spain  26% 28%  13% 6% 
Sweden  31% 35% 16% 14% 14% 
Switzerland  27% 35% 22%  19% 
Turkey       
United Kingdom  25% 30% 26% 22% 19% 
United States    23% 19% 19% 
Sources: IES aggregation of ISCED4 population based on ELFS microdata (available from 2002); OCED. 
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Table 18: Calculated Aggregates 
  2000 2005 2010 
Population 485,506 493,898 501,830 
EU 
GDP 14,120,052 15,601,718 16,398,745 
Population 282,738 296,119 309,961 
US 
GDP 12,827,830 14,436,509 14,939,725 
Source:  Conference Board Total Economy Database, own aggregation 
 
 
